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**Book Reviews**

Editor’s Note

The year 2020 and the first half of 2021 was not only marred by the COVID-19 pandemic, but a multitude of issues also hogged the limelight. Be it the case for the transition of power in the US where Republicans lost to the Democrats and the unfortunate event of the capture of Capitol Hill by politically supported vigilantes showcased the problems in electoral politics and the complete disregard for liberal values enshrined under democratic set up. Further, the transition of premiership form Abe to Suga also raised issues related to the post-Abe economics and how the security disposition of Japan will shape up. It seems that the legacy of Abe continues and there might be a moderate but firm position which will be adopted by Suga. There is no denying of the fact that Suga would face myriad challenges in terms of shrinking economy, rising inflation, and problems in politics.

In the Asian theatre, developments in the South Chain Sea engaged the media while more recently the coup in Myanmar shocked the world and reinforced the view that the military is not meant to be back in barracks for the coup ravaged country. Military junta is not a curious onlooker to this democratic transition but is always looking for a reclamation of power. The Myanmar coup was also a critical moment for the new Biden administration to show its resolve in protecting democratic fundamentals in Asian countries. However, the coup has resulted in many deaths and the prospects of Myanmar returning to democracy look bleak. The Chinese support has also raised problems in the Indian establishment, which, knowing very well that the military will jeopardise its relations with the country if it supports democracy. As a result, India abstained from the vote in the UN on the Myanmar’s military coup. For India, strategic interests were paramount in comparison to the US.

In another development there have been apprehensions that untimely retreat of Prime Minister Abe would compromise Japan’s position vis-a-vis Chain on contentious issues and Prime Minister Suga would undo the work that has been done by Abe. However, these apprehensions were wrong as Prime Minister Suga has his own way of functioning, and being close to Abe, it is expected that he would continue the policies initiated by Abe but in a more nuanced manner. His visit to the US and a few southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, shows his strategic priorities and he has effectively tried to tide over the post COVID effects on the economy. For many commentators Suga might be the second version of Abe but only the future would tell whether he would be able to pursue a more dynamic Japanese foreign policy and adopt a hawkish attitude against China.

India has also been in the limelight with more than a year standoff with China at the Northern Ladakh borders. Pangong lake de-escalation has happened after several rounds on talks, albeit very slowly. Nevertheless, other contentious flash points along northern Ladakh are yet to be resolved. It is seen as China’s intimidatory tactics to coerce India into not joining the western nations and adopt the policy espoused by the US. However, increasing tensions have forced India to join the US-led Quad initiative and even in its policy documents both Indo-pacific and Quad are resonating. This clearly shows that India- China relations are reaching a freeze point where the resolve to reinstate cordial relations would be an arduous task.
Apart from these issues there is also the challenge of addressing the post-COVID economics in southeast Asia and Vietnam is seen as an example given its better economic recovery and the urge to bring about governance reforms. Given the fact that Vietnam has been a state-controlled economy, changes in the edifice would be hard, but given that fact that Vietnam is getting increased foreign direct investment and is committed to corruption free governance systems, the urge to bring about reforms is stronger. Overall, it is expected that Vietnam would try incrementally to shift to welfare economy and would not toy with the idea of capitalist economy given the intrinsic challenges of such an economy was seen in 1997/98 when many countries in Southeast Asia suffered. While Vietnam is still seen as a country with more focus on small and medium enterprises, the need for large foreign direct investment in infrastructure, telecommunications, and software development parks is foreseen in the future. Vietnam is also preparing to be able to adapt to the new revolution brought about by the Industrial Revolution 4.0.

This issue addresses all these issues and brings perspective from international scholars as well as emerging Indian scholars.
Vo Xuan Vinh, Van Ngoc Thanh, Tran Xuan Hiep & Le Phuong Hoa*

**Abstract**

*After the event of March 2011 in Myanmar, the quasi-civilian government’s suspension of China’s big investment projects was considered as evidence for the decline of China’s influence which had been strongly dominant since 1989. The paper argues that besides the dependence on China in terms of economic development and military relations, Myanmar also needs the Chinese support in its peace negotiations with ethnic armed groups and in dealing with Rohingya problem. The pressure posed by the West after the February coup has made Myanmar move closer to China. China’s outstanding influence in Myanmar has posed challenges to India. By using multidisciplinary discourse analyses, this article shows why China has kept its prominent influence in Myanmar since March 2011, how it impacts on India. The article uses historical methodology, in combination with interdisciplinary methods such as comparative analysis, and generalisation. Major sources for the paper include the texts of statements among states, speeches by political leaders, Myanmar Statistical Yearbooks, published articles and books.

**Key words**: China, Myanmar, India, power transition, power rivalry.

**Introduction**

Burma was the first non-communist country to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and Burma-China diplomatic relationship was established on 8 June 1950. Different authors see different phases in Myanmar-China relations. Shee (2002) divided the relations into following phases: ambivalent peaceful coexistence (1949-1961); temporary setback (1962-1970); improving relationship (1971-1988); and closer entente (1989-2002). According to Maung Aung Myoe (2011), Myanmar-China relations from 1948 to 2020 were explained under three phases: charting the water (1948-1962); living dangerously (1962-1988); and towards closer cooperation (1988-2010). David I. Steinberg

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and Hongwei Fan (2012)\(^4\) approach the relations between the two countries by two phases: vicissitudes during the Cold War and the challenges in the Post-Cold War era. It is widely recognised that after the 1988 uprising (8888 incident), the military coup by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September that year, and the military’s refuse to recognise the results of the 1990 election in which the National League of Democracy (NLD) had a landslide victory won, China-Myanmar relationship has been strengthened. By having stated to adhere to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Myanmar, the Chinese government had indicated a clear stand of support for the military regime in Myanmar.\(^5\) From 1989 to March 2011, China-Myanmar relations have been strengthened by a marriage of mutual interests. While Myanmar treats China as its protector in the context of being isolated and posed embargoes, the latter has sought Myanmar for its geopolitical interests and the development of its landlocked Southwestern region. The reforms under Thein Sein started in the late March 2011 posed significant challenges to China after many of its large-scale investment projects in Myanmar were suspended. However, since the Rohingya issue has re-outbursted in 2017 and Myanmar has become a priority in Xi Jinping’s neighbour policy, Chinese influence in the Myanmar gained traction. Chinese outstanding influence in Myanmar is a real challenge for India since Myanmar is an immediate neighbour and an important factor in India’s Look/Act East Policy.

**China’s Interests in Myanmar**

China has clear strategic interests in Myanmar, including border stability, economic, connectivity and major power competition. The shared border has been a controversial story between the two countries due to Beijing’s supports to the Myanmar government and its peace process and at the same time providing shelter, weapons, and other assistance to some of the ethnic armed organizations.\(^6\) However, maintaining security and stability along its porous border with Myanmar is an important objective that China has been pursuing in its relations with Myanmar. For decades, security unrest caused by refugees fleeing conflicts in Myanmar for safety in China because of the conflicts between government military (Tatmadaw) and some ethnic armed groups. Besides, ‘continued conflict has facilitated drug and human trafficking, resource smuggling, and other illicit activity along their common border’.\(^7\)

It is obvious that maintaining a stable shared border with Myanmar helps secure border trade which has played an important role in the development of China’s second poorest province Yunnan. In 2017, Yunnan’s GDP per capita was US$ 5,474, just higher Gansu, the poorest province of China (GDP per capita in 2017 was US$ 4,647).\(^8\) Border trade is important for Yunnan province because Myanmar has been its largest trading partner. In 2008, 40 percent of its exports went to Myanmar and 32 percent of its imports

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\(^7\) USIP Senior Study Group (2018). *op.cit.*, p.16.

came from this country.\textsuperscript{9} Myanmar’s natural resources include oil and gas, various minerals, precious stones and gems, timber and forest product, hydropower potential at a very low level of systematic exploration\textsuperscript{10} have been a big attraction for Chinese investors.

More importantly, China-Myanmar gas and oil pipelines linking Myanmar’s deep-water port of Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal with Kunming in Yunnan province of China went operational in 2015 (gas pipeline) and 2017 (oil pipeline) respectively have helped the world’s biggest oil and gas importer\textsuperscript{11} to receive supplies faster from the Middle East and Africa. In addition, connectivity between China’s mainland province Yunnan with the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar has helped China ‘avoid having to pass through the waters of the Malacca Straits, which are dominated by the U.S. navy and other Asian neighbors allied to the USA’\textsuperscript{12}

Strategically, Myanmar has been a location that China uses to ‘diminish influence of Western countries, particularly the United States, and especially along Myanmar’s border with China’\textsuperscript{13} because ‘(i)t is well known that China harbors a singular sensitivity to Western activity along its extensive border’.\textsuperscript{14} The sensitivity was clearly reflected when Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang warned the president of the Kachin Democratic Party and the president of the Kachin Baptist Convention to face difficult consequences if they had had more frequent communication with Western countries.\textsuperscript{15} Ambassador Hong Liang was also said to urge the US ambassador to Myanmar not to travel to Kachin or eastern parts of Shan state.\textsuperscript{16}

Besides economic purpose as mentioned above, maintaining upper hand in Myanmar also helps China to increase its influence in Indian Ocean region (IOR) in the other, to materialized its “Two-Ocean” Strategy (\textit{Shuanghai Zhanlue}) as pre-conceptualized project set by the Communist Party of China (CPC) appeared in the literature around 2005.\textsuperscript{17} As a result of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization thanks to the economic rapid growths for decades, Chinese Navy has enhanced its ability from the offshore to far seas mission. In order to project power in

\textsuperscript{13} USIP Senior Study Group (2018). \textit{op.cit.}, p.21.
\textsuperscript{14} USIP Senior Study Group (2018). \textit{op.cit.}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{17} Sun, Tom (Guorui) & Payette, Alex (2017, May). China’s Two Ocean Strategy: Controlling waterways and the new silk road. \textit{IRIS Asia Focus}: he Frend Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, No.31, p.2.
the IOR, China launched the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy since the mid-2000s when it started negotiating the use of and investing into port facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Seychelles and the Maldives.18 Since the late 2013, Beijing has also promoted its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative as an alternative narrative to the String of Pearls envisaging a China-centric system of ports in Southeast Asia and the northern Indian Ocean.19 The “String of Pearls” is becoming a reality, as China is establishing a series of port-access arrangements all along the Indian Ocean littoral to east Africa.20 According to Mahadevan, China might reach secret agreements with local governments to create dual-use facilities that would provide a framework for establishing naval bases later.21

A marriage of convenience (1989-March 2011)

As neighboring countries, Myanmar and China had close ties right after two countries gained independence although during the Cold War, the relationship experienced vicissitudes. The military coup in September 1988 and the failure to recognise the 1990 elections in Myanmar significantly contributed to China’s strategic calculations in this Southeast Asian country. The marriage of mutual interests between the two countries has been converged till military regime officially transferred the power to quasi-democracy government in the end of March 2011.

In 1988, the military conducted a coup, and placed Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) under house arrest, and refused to recognize the NLD’s victory in the 1990 general elections. The U.S. and the West opposed and imposed sanctions on the junta. In this context, China voiced to oppose to interfere in Myanmar’s internal affairs, and affirmed that China-Myanmar relations continued when China affirmed not to interference in the internal affairs of Myanmar and continued to maintain trade relations with this country.22 In order to make use the situation to build a dominant role in Myanmar, ‘China used its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council to shield Myanmar from international condemnation and sanctions in the 1990s through the 2000s’.23 In that context, Myanmar’s policy towards China was from ‘strategic neutrality’ to ‘strategic alignment’ when the present military junta took power in 1988.24 The relations between the two countries were described by Senior General Saw Maung, Chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in his first visit to China in 1991 as the Pauk Phaw (fraternal) relations, better understanding and greater cooperation with sympathy towards each other.25
In economic front, since the SLORC was in power, China has become one of the key trading partners, and the most important sources of development assistance for Myanmar. As argued by Maung Aung Myoe:

Like any other country, China uses development assistance as an instrument to win friend and influence people. Chinese development assistance usually comes in the forms of grants, interest free loans, concessional loans and debt relief. Since 1988, international donors have halted all development assistance to Myanmar. The Western Powers, led by the United States, have also imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar. Against this background, China has become a major source of development assistance.

China’s development assistance for Myanmar has been implemented in many forms, including commercially based projects. By the end of 2008, the contract value and turnover of contracted projects, labour services, design, and consulting by Chinese companies in Myanmar stood at US$5.38 billion and US$3.79 billion respectively.

After the 8888 incident, Yangon legitimised and formalised the border trade and then transformed border trade into normal trade with China to enhance trading activities between the two countries. For its part, China promulgated rules and preferential policies on taxes, duties, exchange rates, and export drawbacks in 1991 and 1992 to boost border trade with Myanmar in particular and other Southeast Asian mainland countries sharing common border with China in general. As a result, border trade between Myanmar and China increased from US$139 million in FY 1991-92 to US$1.329 billion in FY 2007-08. As the biggest border trading partner of Myanmar, China has become a main artery of Myanmar’s economy.

In terms of military cooperation, it was estimated that nearly US$4 billion worth of weapons was supplied for Myanmar by China from 1989 to 2010, including combat aircraft, warships, main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, small arms, anti-aircraft guns, and so on when Myanmar faced with the arms embargo imposed by Western sanctions.

However, ‘Myanmar leaders felt sensitive about China’s overwhelming economic and political dominance in Myanmar. Thus, seeking to mitigate Myanmar’s over-dependence on China was one of the factors that caused Myanmar to adopt political reforms’ in March 2011. Myanmar also clearly identified the political motives and pressure from China while enjoying assistance from the latter. Maung Aung Myoe pointed out some incidents showing Chinese unfriendliness toward Myanmar,

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including Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s ignorance to visit Myanmar during his five South and Southeast Asian nation trip in May 2001, and China’s pressure requesting Myanmar’s leaders to fulfill their promises and international obligations after the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) sponsored cracked down the opposition movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi in Depyin in May 2003. Importantly, Myanmar’s decision of reforming began when the Obama administration ushered in a new approach to Myanmar. On September 28, 2009, the State Department announced a change in U.S. policy towards Burma after seven months of review, discussion, and consultation. The existing sanctions regime would remain in place, but new elements of U.S. policy were added. Accordingly, the U.S. decided to launch a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities in a long, slow, and step-by-step process. The U.S. move facilitated its like-minded countries to engage in Myanmar. These trends brought Myanmar authorities a historical opportunity to mitigate Myanmar’s over-dependence on China and integrate itself in to mainstream of economic and political life.

Testing times for Chinese Engagement in Myanmar

The challenges facing China originated from Thein Sein government’s wooing a policy of limiting China’s influence, strengthening relations with the United States and Western countries, and diversifying its international relations. China was also criticized by both the military and NLD authorities. Thein Sein government’s suspension of several big projects invested by China was a major shock to it, which had a dominant influence in Myanmar over the past decade. Myanmar’s move was conducted according to the desire of Myanmar people. However, implementing a more equitable policy with China does not mean that Myanmar will lower China’s role in its foreign policy. The first state visit of President Thein Sein was to China in May 2011 after he went to Indonesia to attend the ASEAN Summit. Accompanying him in the visit was Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing, Defense Minister Hla Min, Minister of Home Affairs Ko Ko and Minister of Border Affairs Thein Htay. President Thein Sein then visited China in September 2012 and in June 2014, respectively. Aung San Suu Kyi who was known widely a figure opposing Chinese key investment projects in Myanmar paid a five-day visit to China in June 2015.

Maintaining good relations with China, Myanmar has also actively normalized its relationship the U.S. Myanmar has actively taken steps to convince the US to lift economic sanctions. In his historical visit to the U.S. in September 2012, President Thein Sein offered 11 commitments including (1) allow the International Committee of the Red Cross access to prisons; (2) establish UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Burma; (3) allow blacklisted people to enter and leave the country; (4) initiate a

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34 Zhu Rongji as the Chinese Premier never visited Myanmar.

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process to assess the criminality of remaining political prisoners; (5) establish a ceasefire in Kachin State; create sustainable political solutions with ethnic minorities; (6) take decisive action in Rakhine State; (7) allow international humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas; (8) sign the Additional Protocol to the UN nuclear agency’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; (9) stop buying weapons from North Korea; (10) provide for more open and accountable government; and (11) combat human trafficking. In his second visit to the U.S. in May 2015, President Thein Sein kept calling the U.S supports for Myanmar’s reform process. Thein Sein in his speech in Johns Hopkins SAIS in May 2013 expressed his desire to begin a new era in Myanmar-US relations. He also called for US assistance in making Myanmar’s transformation a success, especially the support from US government, Congress and civil society organisations for Myanmar democratisation process.

Myanmar also actively approached to European Union (EU). After the political transition, Thein Sein visited Norway, Finland, Austria, Belgium, Italia, the UK, and France in 2013, Germany, Switzerland and Netherland in 2014. In the visits, the president discussed with European leaders on the on-going efforts of Myanmar’s government for political, social and economic reforms, especially his vision and priorities, including how to promote peace, democracy and address poverty.

Myanmar has also become an active member of ASEAN. Hosting ASEAN Summits in 2014, Myanmar proved his role in the organ by allowing the South China Sea dispute to be a content in the agenda despite pressure posed by China. During Myanmar’s chair of ASEAN, ASEAN released Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea when China’s illegally placed its oil rig in the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf of Vietnam. Myanmar has also actively prepared for its involvement in ASEAN community building process. At the United Nations level, Myanmar has in one hand committed to continuing its reform process and called the UN and its members to understand and support Myanmar, in the other. It also participated and cooperated with the work of the UN in various fields as a responsible and respectable nation on the world stage.

44 Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nation (2012, September 27). Statement by His Excellency U Thein Sein, President of the Union of Myanmar and Chairman of the
As a result, China's influence on Myanmar experienced difficulties. Although in his visit to China in May 2011, President Thein Sein ‘appreciated China’s long-term and tremendous assistance to Myanmar, which he said contributed a lot to the economic and social development of his country” and “underscored their commitment to boosting bilateral relations, and they agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’,45 China lost its advantages in Myanmar, at least Chinese investment projects such as Letpadaung copper mine, Myitsone hydro power dam, and, Kyaukpyu – Kunming railway project and Tagaung nickel mine. Regarding the Letpadaung copper mine project operated under a contract between military-owned Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Company (UMEHL) and Wanbao Mining, a Chinese company, a significant numbers of riots taking place in 2012 and 2013 to protest the project.46 The report of Letpadaung Taung Investigation Commission released in April 2013 also stated that the mine lacked strong environmental protection measures, had been developed without environmental, social, and health impact assessments having taken place, or an environmental management. Especially, the report acknowledged that the project would not necessarily create jobs for residents and a decision to close the mine could be problematic regarding Myanmar’s international relations.47

NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi in 2012 also raised voice to criticize the aggressive attack on protesters, who say ‘no’ to a copper mine that damaged their environment and cultural sites.48 A symbol of China’s growing public relations disaster in Myanmar is the $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project built by the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation, was suspended on September 30, 2011 just six months after the government of President Thein Sein took power.49 Further, the US$20 billion railway project connecting China’s southern Yunnan province with Myanmar’s Rakhine western coast at the Bay of Bengal was cancelled in July 2011 after over three years of inaction on a 2011 agreement.50 As a result, Chinese investment in Myanmar decreased sharply as mentioned above. Notably, the consequences of some big Chinese invested projects, including Myitsone dam, pipeline connecting Rakhine state and China, and Letpadaung copper mine, have created Myanmar elite concerns about its over dependence on China.
and anti-China increasing sentiment at a popular level among communities in Myanmar.51

**Regaining Influence**

There are issues to be addressed between China and Myanmar such as the possibility of re-operating the Myitsone hydropower project, and Tagaung nickel's waste treatment plan or China's involvement in Myanmar's NCA negotiation process. However, China’s political and security and economic importance to Myanmar in the context that the US and the West imposed sanctions on many Myanmar officials and government in response to the Rohingya crisis making relations between China and Myanmar closer under NLD government in the Southeast Asian country.

It is fair to say that, although China has suspended or re-considered major projects invested by China, China-Myanmar relationship was upgraded to comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in the visit of Myanmar President Thein Sein to China in May. Before the general elections held, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi had paid a five-day visit to China in June 2015. The landslide victory of NLD in the general elections in November 2015 was considered to represent a trump of hope for those who never gave up the fight for democracy.52 However, ethnic problems, especially the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has been accused of turning a blind eye to the military’s violent persecution against Rohingya in Rakhine state53 has invited the critics and sanctions posed by the U.S,54 EU and some other countries.55 South Korean Gwangju human rights groups also stated to strip Aung San Suu Kyi of its 2004 prize because of her "indifference" to the atrocities against the Rohingya minority.56 In contrast, in her visit to China in June 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi was warmly received by both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. In a special step, China invited Aung San Suu Kyi to attend the Communist Party of China (CPC)'s Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting in November 2017. In the meeting with her after the Dialogue,

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President Xi called for more party-to-party cooperation. The most important move showing Chinese strategic engagement in Myanmar was the historic visit of President Xi to Myanmar in January 2020, the first visit of a Chinese President and Secretary General of CPC to Myanmar after 19 years, since the visit of Jiang Zemin’s trip in 2001. In the visit, President Xi described China-Myanmar relationship to be ‘the special bond’, ‘a bond as close as between lips and teeth’. The visit was part of a push to make Myanmar a vital stop on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s flagship “Belt and Road” initiative. The visit also demonstrated Beijing’s eagerness to seek Myanmar leaders’ support for its ambitious BRI infrastructure projects in the country and finalize a deal on the development of the Kyaukpyu port, which boosts China’s presence in the Indian Ocean.

In Rohingya problem, China has followed a realistic approach which contrasts with what the U.S. and many Western countries have done. China has considered the Rohingya crisis as an opportunity to reestablish its primacy among Myanmar’s foreign relationships, attract popular support in Myanmar, and assert its leadership in regional affairs by buffering Myanmar from international pressure and taken steps to protect Myanmar from criticism and punitive actions in the United Nations Security Council. China supports Myanmar’s policy on Rohingya issue by disapproving of internationalizing the issue. Especially, China has taken steps to become a mediator of the Rohingya crisis by proposing a three-step solution to address the issue to Myanmar and Bangladesh in 2017. Some considered as ‘the biggest obstacle to a prosecution of its leaders at an international war crimes tribunal’.

In Myanmar’s process of peaceful negotiation with armed ethnic groups, China has got involved to play a bigger role in the process. Previously, China funded ethnic-Chinese insurgent groups in north and northeastern Myanmar to escalate conflict that would decrease government control over the states that border China. This gave Beijing

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57 Xinhua (2017, December 1). Xi meets Aung San Suu Kyi, calls for more party-to-party cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-12/01/content_3516902.htm
61 USIP Senior Study Group (2018). op.cit., p.8
both influences among the rebel groups closest to its border and leverage over Myanmar’s government in any peace negotiation. When the peace negotiation was launched under Thein Sein government in Myanmar, China actively participated in the process by organizing talks between KIO and Myanmar government in 2013. China also proposed to be the chair of the talk, but it was rejected by both Myanmar government and KIO and had to settle with an observer role.

Since the new government sworn in Myanmar in 2016, China has adjusted its approach to the Myanmar’s peace process. China publicly committed its continued support to the peace process administered by the NLD government by donating three million USD to the peace process in earlier 2016, a scenario that might have been impossible during the former Thein Sein government. China has also lobbied non-signatory groups to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), including the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army in the eastern Shan state, to join the 21st Century Panglong Conference. In March 2017, Beijing organised a meeting between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the military wing of KIO and the Myanmar government to mitigate fighting along the Myanmar-China border. In this meeting, the role of China was shown when the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest ethnic armed group in Myanmar announced that it wanted to completely do away with the government’s NCA and proposed China to manage a new peace process. In 2017, China donated $1 million and pledged $3 million to Myanmar’s government’s peace process work, in addition to separate contributions for relief to internally displaced persons. In order to improve its image in a changing Myanmar, Beijing has ordered secretive state-owned Chinese companies to publicly embrace Western-style corporate social responsibility practices and act humbly toward the people who live near their projects.

After the shocks made by the suspension of Myitsone dam and Kyaupyu-Kunming railway projects, China decided to regain the role of the most important investor in Myanmar. During Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Myanmar in November 2014, the two sides signed agreements worth $7.8 billion in fields of energy, agriculture, telecommunications, infrastructure, and finance. Besides the traditional investment projects in Myanmar such as energy, infrastructure, finance and telecommunications, China has now focused on other sectors with a US$300 million agricultural project.

While Myanmar government and key officials have been imposed and sanctions by the US and its like-minded countries due to Rohingya crisis, China has actively convinced Myanmar to participate in Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. In Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to China in December 2017, China officially proposed to build the China-Myanmar economic corridor (CMEC), the estimated 1,700-kilometre-long corridor connecting Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, to Myanmar’s major economic checkpoints first to Mandalay in central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ). In December 2018, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) implementation steering committee, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, met. Myanmar and China official launched the CMEC, an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) when two countries signed a 15 point MoU on CMEC in May 2019 in the sideline of BRI Forum in China. Although Myanmar has scaled back the US$7.3 billion Kyaukpyu deep water port due to debt concerns and it has only approved nine out of 30 Chinese proposed projects under the CMEC, it also reflects Myanmar’s willingness to participate in China’s BRI. During the visit of President Xi to Myanmar, two sides signed a total of 33 memorandums of understanding (MOUs), agreements, exchange letters and protocols - probably the most Myanmar has signed with its powerful neighbor at one time since 2000. The agreements called for cooperation in sectors including infrastructure mega-project development, railways, industrial and power projects, trade, investment and human resources, among others.76

Thanks to its efforts, China has become Myanmar’s number one partner in fields of political, economic, and military. In other words, China has regained its ‘upper hand’ in Myanmar. Besides sanctions posed by the U.S. and some Western countries due to Rohingya issue, ASEAN—an important partner of Myanmar since 1997—also requested ‘Myanmar authorities to ensure the safety of civilians, take immediate steps to end the violence in Rakhine, restore normal socioeconomic conditions, and address the refugee problem’. Among factors heavily influencing Myanmar on Rohingya issue, China seems to be the only a big partner that Myanmar can relies on. Before the visit of Aung San Suu Kyi to China in December 2017, Commander-in-chief of Defense Services Senior


Another trump for China in Myanmar is that the CPC seems to have good party-to-party relations with NLD when Aung San Suu Kyi, as the party’s leader, participated in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting in November 2017. She thanked China for inviting her to attend the Dialogue.\footnote{Xinhua (2017, December 1). Xi meets Aung San Suu Kyi, calls for more party-to-party cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-12/01/content_3516902.htm} In 2016, more than 20 members of NLD were invited to China and they were felt very happy because they were treated as VIPs.\footnote{Shoon Naing & Lewis, Simon (2019, August 11). Myanmar politicians take advantage of China’s junket tours. The japan times. Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/11/asia-pacific/myanmar-politicians-take-advantage-chinas-junket-tours/#Xo1D6cgzZq1} This was such a turning point in Ang San Suu Kyi’s and NLD’s view of CPC. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD’s members should have not thought of NLD’s formal relations with CPC because the NLD was forged in an uprising against one-party rule. However, Myo Nyunt, the NLD spokesman explained that Aung San Suu Kyi chose to the country to visit based on what Myanmar’s interests despite that country is inclination to dictatorship or democracy.\footnote{Ibid.}

Regarding the NCA process, although Myanmar has realized China’s intention, it needs the support from China in terms of finance, transportation for representatives of key ethnic armed groups participating in the process. Especially, without China’s pressure, groups such as KIA, UWSA might have not participated in the process.


In terms of investment, after Myanmar government suspension of some Chinese key projects, Chinese investment in Myanmar decreased significantly. In FY2010-2011
fiscal year, China's FDI in Myanmar was US$ 8.269 billion, accounted for 41.35 percent of Myanmar's total inward investment. However, after the political change in Myanmar in March 2011, Chinese investment in Myanmar decreased to US$231.773 million\textsuperscript{84} and to the lowest point of US$56.160 million\textsuperscript{85} in FY2012-13 and FY2013-14 respectively. Accordingly, China accounted for only 16.33 percent and 1.37 percent of Myanmar's total inward FDI. After the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Myanmar in 2014, China's FDI in Myanmar increased to US$551.415 million in FY 2014-15 and reached US$3.324 billion in FY 2015-16. In FY2015-16, Chinese FDI in Myanmar accounted for 35.06 percent of the latter's total inward FDI. Especially, as March 31 of 2018, out of Myanmar's US$76.028 billion cumulative foreign investment, Chinese investment was US$19.950 billion, accounted for 26.24 percent, the largest portion among countries and territories investing in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{86} 

In contrast to the ups and downs of its investment in Myanmar and of Myanmar-China political relations, China has maintained as the largest trading partner of Myanmar. Before the government transition in March 2011, China accounted for 22 percent of Myanmar's total trade. In the first fiscal year after the transition, the proportion of Myanmar-China trade in Myanmar's total trade value increased to 27.5 percent. Bilateral Myanmar-China trade value reached US$11.78 billion in FY 2017-2018, accounting for 35.14 percent of total trade value of Myanmar. In the same fiscal year, two other key trading partners of Myanmar, Thailand and Singapore accounted only 15.13 percent and 11.44 percent of Myanmar's total trade value.\textsuperscript{87} 

The Chinese factor is able to influence on Myanmar economic growth. After decades of close relations with China, Myanmar continues to depend on China. According to a report of the World Bank in June 2019, 'growth in the medium term will be supported by a gradual rebound in infrastructure investment and higher productivity in sectors undergoing liberalization, such as wholesale and retail and the insurance and banking sectors'.\textsuperscript{88} As mentioned above, most of mega projects in Myanmar are being invested by China. 

Besides, by copying the Chinese model of attracting foreign investment for the purpose of export production, the government plans to create new zones – Pathein and Myawaddy. In addition, the authorities have established 18 industrial parks in the following regions: Ayeyarwady (3), Bago (1), Magway (2), Mandalay (3), Mon State (1), Sagaing (2), Shan State (1), Tanintharyi (1), Yangon and surrounding areas (4). Despite their limited use – only 20 percent of the area of industrial parks is used, the government plans to open an additional ten units: in the Bago region (1), Chin state (1) Kayin state

\textsuperscript{85} Ministry of Planning and Finance, the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2015). \textit{op.cit.}, p.460. 
\textsuperscript{86} Ministry of Planning and Finance, the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2018). \textit{op.cit.}, pp.461-462. 
\textsuperscript{87} Ministry of Planning and Finance, the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2018). \textit{op.cit.}, pp.441&450. 
(1), Mandalay area (3), Mon state (1), Rakhine state (1), Shan state (1), and Tanintharyi (1).

This means that, building those industrial parks needs more investment from China. Operating process of those parks also needs more cooperation from the neighboring country. Rather than that, Chinese influence is also on Myanmar’s financial sector since the sector has also adapted China’s model of development, from its structure and activities.90

Implications for India

It is obvious that China has regained its upper-hand in Myanmar comprehensively. This has posed challenges to India’s interests. There are views on China’s ambition to build Kyaukpyu as a naval port, not for commercial use.91 In January 2020, Chinese Navy units and marine commandos were detected to have their presence in Karachi, Pakistan.92 Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar along with those in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, the Maldives, and Bangladesh could reinforce China’s String of Pearls Strategy which has been considered to further encircle India.93

One of the main goals of India’s Act East Policy (AEP) is to break the isolation for the Northeast region. However, trading activities between India and China through Na Thula pass in Sikkim have faced with challenges due to confrontation has sometimes happened between Chinese and Indian troops.94 When the confrontation has not taken place, bilateral border trading has not been easy to conduct, including ‘the fragility of land, lack of infrastructure, lack of trade knowledge in local aspirants, duration of trade, language barrier, climatic conditions and limited numbers of commodities allowed for export from this region’.95 As a key partner of India in the region, Bangladesh is crucial for stability in the north-eastern region.96 However, connectivity between Northeast region with the Bay of Bengal and with Kolkata through Bangladesh facilitated by the Indo-Bangladesh Protocol for Inland Transit and Trade (IBPITT) has

fallen into disuse due to various challenges over the years. Although efforts have been made to improve the situation, vulnerability of the IBPITT is there when it goes through a foreign country. In that context, another gateway for the Northeastern region through Myanmar is very important. Obviously, Chinese outstanding influence in Myanmar has posed a significant hindrance to AEP.

Against this background, India may consider some measures it could take to protect its national security and interests in Myanmar, including increasing engagement in Myanmar and proactively counterbalance with China in strategic regions. The Rohingya issue is deemed Myanmar government’s most vulnerable point that China has been making use to regain its dominance. China has taken side with Myanmar government who has been accused of turning a blind eye to the military’s violent persecution against Rohingya in Rakhine state. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) on Rakhine State Development Program (RSDP) signed in December 2017 and four of 10 MoUs signed between India and Myanmar during Myanmar President U Win Myint’s four day visit to Myanmar in February 2020 focused on socio-economic development of Rakhine State show India’s strong commitment and engagement in Rohingya repatriation in Myanmar.

Democratisation process which gained a milestone in March 2011 has been facing with challenges since Rohingya issue reemerged in 2017. NLD that won a landslide victory in the 2015 elections has been criticised for being unable to protect human rights in Myanmar. The February 2021 coup has further made the democratic process worse. India’s consistent supports for Myanmar’s demoratisation process for decades need to be maintained and promoted. The India-Myanmar Joint Statement during the State Visit of the President of Myanmar to India in February 2020 stated that ‘India reaffirmed its support for Myanmar’s efforts towards national reconciliation, peace process and democratic transition to establish a democratic federal union’. Political situation in Myanmar is another challenge for India in its efforts to increase influence in the country. China’s political and economic dominance in Myanmar thanked to the sanctions imposed by the United States and some Western countries on the Southeast Asian country. For its part, India’s low investment in Myanmar in compare with that of China correctly reflects the fact that India is not a power in terms of outward investment. In that context, instead of investing in huge infrastructure projects in Myanmar, India may focus on completing projects that have taken long time such as Trilateral Highway with Myanmar and Thailand. Rather than that, investing in human developments in

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Myanmar will provide valuable results for the future of Myanmar and of India-Myanmar relations. Increasing investment in both sides India-Myanmar border regions to improve the livelihood of the people living in the areas should consider as a way to ‘train’ forces to protect stability and security in border areas. In addition, while Chinese investment sources could be disbursed easily thanks to its political regime, India’s democratic political system has sometimes faced with challenges posed by complicated procedures.

Myanmar is also a potential arms and military equipment market. A SIPRI factsheet released in March 2018 shows that, China is the largest supplier of arms and military equipment for Myanmar in the period of 2013-2017, accounted for 68 per cent of the latter’s total imports, followed by Russia with 15 per cent.\textsuperscript{100} India was one of eight countries as arms and military equipment suppliers to this Southeast Asian country, according to a report released by the United Nations Human Rights Council in August 2019. However, China continued to dominate Myanmar weapon market since five Chinese State-owned enterprises have participated in the mission. Only two Indian enterprises have exported arms and military equipment to Myanmar, including Bharat Dynamics Limited, and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).\textsuperscript{101} India’s exporting of strategic arms and military equipment to Myanmar recently such as a Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine INS Sindhuvir to the Myanmar Navy\textsuperscript{102} in April 2020 could be seen as a bold step.

In a larger space, India could also consider enhancing its deterrence capability in the Bay of Bengal and increasing engagement in the West Pacific to protect its interests in the wake of China’s ambitious two-ocean strategy. In the Bay of Bengal, the forceful Eastern Naval Command located in Visakhapatnam in east coast and the Andaman and Nicobar command with INS Jarawa naval base and INS Kohassa new air base help Indian Navy control sea routes connecting Indian Ocean and sea ports in Myanmar and Bangladesh, the proposed Kra Straits in Thailand and even the Malacca Straits.

The South and East China Seas, Western Pacific Ocean, and their littoral regions are categorised as India’s secondary areas of maritime interest.\textsuperscript{103} However, this is an important front for India to counterbalance China since China has increased its presence and influence in Indian Ocean region where India categorises as its primary area of maritime interest.\textsuperscript{104} In that context, India has also increased its strategic engagement in the South China Sea in the Western Pacific where China has also

\textsuperscript{104} Ministry of Defence (Navy) (2015). op.cit., p.32.
determined as a part of its core interests, along with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Recently, India has sent naval ships for operational deployment to the South China Sea and the North West Pacific. Indian Navy joined multilateral joint naval exercises with Navies of the US, Japan and the Philippines in the South China Sea in 2019. Indian naval ships have also conducted variety of friendship visits to countries in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in the last decades. Notably, India has strategic presence in the South China Sea since Indian ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) partnered with Petro Vietnam to explore oil and gas in the sea since 1988. It is obvious that Indian presence in the South China Sea and in the Western Pacific Ocean in general is a suitable way to counterbalance with China’s growing engagement in the Indian Ocean.

**Conclusion**

Although there are concerns in Myanmar over the debt trap from some Chinese investment projects and China’s use the ethnic armed groups as a hostage in its relations with Myanmar, Myanmar government under NLD seems to have no choice but to rely on China while facing with sanctions posed by the US and some Western countries since Rohingya crisis reemerged in 2017. Along with Russia, China’s support for Myanmar after the February 2021 coup has assured junta’s unrivaled position in Myanmar. Thanks to the move, China has regained the outstanding influence in Myanmar which sharply decreased after its key projects had suspended under quasi-democratic government resumed in March 2011. Politically, China has become Myanmar’s protector in the United Nations. China has reemerged as the largest investor and trading partner of Myanmar. China has also been the closest military partner of Myanmar. Some key economic sectors of Myanmar such as model of attracting foreign investment, and financial sector have been adapted from Chinese model. Chinese mega infrastructure projects under BRI will significantly contribute to Myanmar’s economic growth in medium term. China’s outstanding influence in Myanmar directly poses challenges to Indian security in the East and AEP. In that context, India may consider a two-layer strategy to limit the challenges, including promoting its engagement in Myanmar, and enhancing its control over the Bay of Bengal and naval presence in the Western Pacific Ocean.

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**Article -II**

**Changing Dynamics of Nihon\(^1\)-Indo Diplomatic Ties: From Shinzo Abe to Yoshihide Suga**

Ashutosh Kumar*

**ABSTRACT**

The geopolitical scenario in the Indo-Pacific\(^2\) region is changing rapidly. India, Japan and other oceanic states are facing new multidimensional challenges manifested in the unpeaceful\(^3\) rise of China. In this shadow, India-Japan ties have witnessed unprecedented growth in the last decade. Outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his counterpart in India have been instrumental for India-Japan bilateral relations taking a dramatic leap forward. Abe's visionary approach recognised India's strategic importance, as he worked tirelessly to take the relations to its new heights with his personal chemistry with the Indian Prime Minister. His proactive policy transformed South Block's expectations of Japan as a strong, influential and dependable partner in East Asia. Yoshihide Suga has succeeded Shinzo Abe as Japanese Prime minister. The initial days of Suga’s foreign policy began by prioritising Vietnam, the USA and Australia, pointing out a different approach to Japan's foreign policy. Suga's political commitment to foreign affairs is secondary to the focus on domestic issues. The article is a comparative study of the foreign policy approaches of two Japanese Prime Ministers Abe and Suga towards India. In view of Abe’s accomplishments, it is natural that India might be concerned about the transition to a new leader. The paper will try to analyse the reliability of Japan in the vulnerable security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region and the Suga government's willingness to engage actively in the Asian order for democratic values and the rule of law. Though India may not be Suga's top priority, India needs to actively leverage the strengths of the Abe-era partnership to keep it relevant.

**Key Words:** Shinzo Abe, Yoshihide Suga, Abenomics, Suganomics, Foreign Policy, Indo-Pacific region, Security, China

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga took charge as the 99th Prime Minister of Japan, following the resignation by country’s longest-serving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Nine months ago, Suga was a little-known entity in global politics and academia. Closeness to Abe proved enough to propel Suga to the helm of the nation. After taking over the PM-ship, Suga declared that his cabinet would be one of continuity, to further the mission and policies championed by Shinzo Abe (CNA, 2020). It indicates that the Suga regime will continue with the military modernisation and post-war policy of pre-emptive strike capability (Kuper, 2020). Before dwelling on the policies of both the leaders, let us look at the unpredicted exit of Abe and the rise of Suga in the political echelons of Japan.

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\(^{1}\) Nihon Translates to "Japan"

\(^{2}\) Indo-Pacific also refers to Asia Pacific

\(^{3}\) The term *Unpeaceful rise of China* is coined by John J Mearsheimer
Shinzo Abe’s Sudden Exit

The unexpected resignation of Abe surprised Japan and the world. Abe became the longest-serving Prime Minister in the history of Japanese parliament, the Diet, which includes two stints in office— one short for a year (2006-07) and another for a longer tenure of almost eight years (2012-2020). Abe’s stepping down truly symbolises the end of an era in Japanese politics. Abe developed many personal relationships with world leaders, such as with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As C Raja opines, “Few modern international interlocutors of India brought the kind of personal affection and policy innovation that Prime Minister Abe did in the engagement with Delhi. For Abe, India was very special” (Mohan, 2020).

Abe’s sudden resignation brought praise from all corners of the world, commending Abe for his contribution in strengthening Japan’s relations with other States, calling him a "true friend" and a "great friend". Prime Minister Modi expressed grief and addressed Abe as "my dear friend", acknowledging the role of Abe in deepening India-Japan ties (Modi, 2020). During the Shinzo Abe tenure, India and Japan deepened their bilateral relationship and broadened it by establishing a ‘triangular cooperation’ framework with countries in Africa, West Asia, and South Asia. With Abe’s resignation, multiple names came out for his succession and what might be in the bag for ever-evolving Japan’s foreign policy. Japanese media named multiple prominent leaders as the probable faces for the prime minister of Japan after Abe’s exit. It included LDP politician and former Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba; former Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida; veteran Defence Minister Taro Kano; and Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, as potential replacements for Shinzo Abe. These names played in rounds in Japanese media, transitioning from Abe to New LDP president.

During the transition, what surprised Japanese politics was that prominent LDP leaders and the largest faction of Abe supporters, rallied around Suga for Prime Ministership. Suga was the longest-serving Chief Secretary under the Abe government and an influential bureaucrat. He kept a low profile until 2019, when he unveiled a new imperial era named Reiwa4 (McCurry, 2019). This made Suga a popular and prominent figure in Nihon politics and earned the title “Uncle Reiwa” (Macarthur, 2019). Due to his portfolio of controlling domestic affairs, he was little known internationally. Ishiba and Kishida were more familiar in the international domain; however, they lost the presidency to Suga. The sudden leaving of the PM-ship by Abe also surprised Modi and the South Block. Shinzo Abe left a colossal legacy of robust Indo-Japanese diplomatic ties.

India-Japan Relations Under Abe

Abe played a significant role in strengthening the bilateral ties between India-Japan. His speech, quoting a Mughal scholar-prince Dara Shikoh—the confluence of two seas’ (Shinzo, 2007) in the Parliament of India and articulated the Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 defining high-powered diplomacy. However, the world will never forget Shinzo Abe’s contribution in transforming post-world war Japan to play a more significant and vital

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4 It translated to Japanese New Imperial Era. It comprises two Kanji characters rei and wa. The character is taken from a poem about plum blossoms which appears in Manyoshu, the oldest existing collection of Japanese poetry. In literary context rei translates to “fortune” or “auspicious” whereas wa translates to “peace” or “harmony”.

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role in international politics by coming out of its comfort zone under the American security umbrella and encouraging the Asians to search for their identity.

Even though the protectionist regimes challenged the global liberal order, India and Japan converged their geo-political and geo-economic visions and converted them into actions. Perhaps befitting, India and Japan signed major military agreements during the Shinzo Abe era. Abe played an instrumental role in bringing Delhi and Tokyo closer in the security and strategic realm. The bilateral strategic relation reached its highest ladder under Abe when India-Japan signed an agreement facilitating the reciprocal provision of supplies and services between their respective armed forces to offer each other military support (Times, 2020). After Australia, India is the second country with which Japan signed such an agreement. India and Japan advanced issue-based alignment through QUAD, Japan-USA-India trilateral and creation of Resilient Supply Chain Initiative between Australia-India-Japan. Japan is the sixth country with which India has signed the agreement after Australia, France, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States.

The contemporary situation in North-East Asia is characterised by changing regional geopolitics with assertive China, alliance politics in Indo-Pacific and hedging against America’s abandonment, which shapes contemporary Tokyo’s strategic discourse. India was at the centre of Abe’s heart to restructure the regional and global order. The present-day Indo-Pacific resulted from the ‘confluence of two seas’, which widened Japan’s geographic horizon to include the Indian Ocean. It allowed Delhi to reclaim its lost strategic potential in the Pacific Ocean. The dream of ‘Broader Asia’ broke away geographical boundaries, which are taking a distinct form now. His initial efforts for a greater Indo-Pacific lost steam after he stepped down in 2007 due to ill health.

On returning to power in 2012, Abe took cognisance of the past initiative with much vigour and zeal amid mounting challenges from China. Shinzo Abe’s strategic calculation included both external and internal balancing. Abe restructured the post-war strategic posture, strengthened U.S. relations on his terms, and created a web of strategic partnerships across the Indo-Pacific region. In defining his ‘vast seas’ strategy, Abe was transforming Japan’s geo-political standing in the world. Before Abe, Japan struggled to position itself in international politics which swung between being an ‘economic giant’ and a ‘pacifist state’. Abe ushered Japan into regaining the leadership role in Asia amidst the growing uncertainty over the U.S. security guarantee and China’s muscular policies.

Abe conceptualised a world order based on a universal value, which is complemented by India’s Act East Policy. The personal relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, mutuality of values and convergence of strategic interests deepened the relationship between India and Japan. Much of the thrust to the bilateral relations was given by the personal camaraderie between the two leaders. From the Shinkansen ride to Kobe to having a private dinner at Yamanashi home, Ganga aarti at Varanasi to the roadshow in Sabarmati Ashram- Abe has left a deep and heart-warming impression in Indian public memory.

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5 Translates to Bullet Train
Suga’s Entry

Yoshihide Suga is not a typical LDP leader. Though in the political domain, he is called Abe’s "right-hand" man, he stands in contrast to Abe with his political approaches. Like any other nation, dynastic politics prevails in Japan, and Shinzo Abe is among the blue blood pedigree. Around forty percent of Japanese Parliamentarians today are from different political families. Out of thirty Prime Ministers since post World War II, around twenty-seven were hereditary politicians. Like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Suga is a self-made first-generation politician. From working in a strawberry farm to negotiating the confusing web of politics, he has steadily moved from being a municipal man to the Parliament in 1996 and now to the powerful prime ministerial position in 2020. However, Suga has big shoes to fill in.

Suga is not a member of any LDP faction, though he has mastered the moves of Japanese politics and the art of inter-factional negotiation. Suga, in his book titled Seijika no Kakugo: Kanryo o ugokasu (Commitment as Politicians: Shakeup Bureaucracy), broke the long-standing ‘silo-culture’ of Japanese bureaucracy. Suga may be an experienced hand when it comes to the internal dynamics of Japanese politics and governance, however his problem lies in lack of experience in the domain of foreign policy. Suga admitted his weakness in global diplomacy by stating that he “lacks the diplomatic skills of outgoing leader Shinzo Abe” (The Mainichi, 2020). Prime Minister Modi congratulated Suga and concurred on his vision of a stable and peaceful Indo-pacific during a phone call and expressed his intention to further strengthen the Indo-Japan relationship based on mutual trust and shared values (MEA, 2020).

India’s Position in Suga’s Foreign Policy

India remains one of Japan’s essential partners in the post-Abe era. Suga’s determination to continue the policies of his predecessor will surely translate in the foreign policy domain as he follows Abe’s well tested path. However, the personal touch which Abe provided to India may not be there. Developing personal ties when the world is grappling a pandemic is an arduous task, and will take time and effort. Suga has far too many important issues in the domestic and Southeast Asian domain to put all his efforts and diplomatic focus on the Indian relationship.

For now, the foreign policy apparatus of Suga will focus more on strengthening U.S. relations as US is the sole security provider for Japan. The Suga government cannot take their eyes from the Biden administration. On Biden’s victory, Suga congratulated him by expressing the hope of strengthening the alliance further- 'Japan and the United States are allies tied firmly by bonds and shared values, Tokyo is looking forward to reinforcing the alliance and realizing a free and open Indo Pacific' (Kyodo, 2021). In a later conversation with Biden, the United States gave assurance to defend Senkaku Islands, a group of East China Sea islets administered by Tokyo, however, claimed by China. The comment drew the ire of China, which often sends its naval assets around the island for muscle-flexing.

Other key concerns of Tokyo are the Korean Peninsula in general and China in particular. The ties under Abe with South Korea can be best described as persistent lows (Ferrier, 2020). The resignation of Abe took the Moon administration of South Korea by surprise. Some commentators in South Korea criticised for ruining one of the most
crucial democratic relationships in Asia (Park, 2020). The bilateral relationship was caught in the middle due to historical issues stemming from Japan’s colonisation of the Korean Peninsula. When Abe took back power in 2012, Sino-Japanese relations were in an abysmal state. After that, Abe offered an olive branch and even delayed dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic to host Chinese Premier Xi Jinping in Tokyo. Eventually, the visit did not fructify due to a rise in cases of Covid-19 infections. Since the region is witnessing China’s hard policies in different spheres, it will be a challenge for Suga to deal with it without escalating tensions.

Abe’s signature narrative of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” will be the core of Japanese foreign policy in the upcoming days, even under Suga. By this narrative, India gains centrality in Suga’s strategic and security architecture, becoming an asset for Japan. Tokyo under Suga will be eager to continue this policy to play a vital and active role in Indo-Pacific. Security, diplomatic and economic partnership will continue to be broad in scope. In his first call with Modi, Suga reassured Japan’s commitment to promoting bilateral cooperation in security and economic matters and to work with India to achieve a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (Chaudhury, 2020). India-Japan also discussed supply chain issues during the COVID pandemic and regional connectivity issues.

Transition From an Economy Centric to a Broader Gamut Of Relations

India-Japan relations for most pre and post-Cold-war periods were solely based on shallow and narrow focussed economic relations with minimal political interaction. Relations, despite being friendly lacked breadth and depth and were limited to direct economic assistance from Japan. with Maruti-Suzuki a grand success. India was in the periphery of Japan’s strategic calculation, while significant focus was given to China and Southeast Asian nations. The prominent Japanese scholar Takenori Horimoto in the mid-1990’s opined that “Japan and India have long been out of sync, and their mutual interests coincide rarely” (Horimoto, 1993). Even the small-scale relation reached a cliff in the wake of India’s nuclear test in 1998, attracting condemnation from Tokyo, which led to a near breakdown of the bilateral relationship.

The dent in the relationship recovered after the visit of Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to India in 2000. This visit propelled the bilateral relationship forward. Mori’s successor Junichiro Koizumi (2001-06) kept the relationship on an upward trajectory; however, Abe’s visit in 2007 created new dimensions in the bilateral relations between India and Japan. In his second stint as PM in 2012, Abe worked closely with former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and from mid-2014, both Abe and Modi wrote new chapters of success in Indo-Japanese ties. No doubt, bilateral trade and Foreign Direct Investment by Japan saw an upward swing. However, what took the limelight was defence and strategic ties between the two states.
India-Japan Security and Defence Links


Since the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008 and 2009, the Action plan paved the way for advanced security cooperation. Since then, Indian and Japanese Defence Chiefs’ visit each other regularly and hold talks on mutual concerns, to promote better synergy between the forces. There is still a vast potential of defence ties which India and Japan have not tapped yet. India and Japan upgraded the 2+2 dialogue to the ministerial level in 2018. The inaugural talks in the new format were held in 2019, where a significant announcement was made regarding the India-Japan Joint Fighter Aircraft exercise (Chaudhury, 2019).

Significantly under Abe, Japan shifted from its position on having a nuclear energy agreement with a Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory by signing an agreement with India in 2016. Interestingly, India is the only non-NPT signatory state with which Japan signed such a nuclear pact. In the final year of Abe’s Prime Ministership in 2020, the two countries signed the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for the defence forces of the two countries to share supplies. One can clearly say that India’s position in Japan’s defence vision has gone up. In its 2020 defence white paper, Japan mentioned Australia and India as number one and number two defence partners after the United States (MoD, 2020).

Besides multiple security and strategic frameworks, the two nations have created platforms such as the India-Japan-US trilateral, India-Japan-Australia trilateral and the India-Japan-US-Australia, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The Quad platform has given a significant push to the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Even during the pandemic, India, the USA, Japan, and Australia held a quad meeting in 2020 to discuss the post COVID world order and building a resilient supply chain (India, 2020). No joint statement was released showing a lack of consensus among the Quad nations. Although “China” was not mentioned by name in the meeting, the group’s key concern remains Chinese assertive and aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region, a cause of concern to the Quad nations.

Joint India Comprehensive Security Dialogue 2001
Joint Statement towards a Japan India Strategic and Global Partnership 2006
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India 2008
Bilateral 2+2 dialogue between defence and foreign affairs representative 2009
### Transition From Abe to Suga

With the sudden news of Abe’s resignation in August 2020, Indian media outlets and think tanks carried several media reports and commentaries, emphasising Abe’s legacy and his role in giving a new direction to the bilateral ties. Famous diplomat Shyaml Saran rhetorically asked whether India-Japan relations will remain as strong as the Abe era (Saran, 2020). The Suga regimes are in their early days; however, as the indications suggest, there is unlikely to be a tectonic shift in the India-Japan relationship.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Developments</th>
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<tr>
<td>The relation will miss its acceleration due to the limited experience of Suga and will majorly depend upon his Foreign Minister Toshimotsu Motegi and new defence minister Nobuo Kishi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suga, in his telephone conversation with Modi, confirmed bilateral commitment to the relationship and step-up cooperation in security and economic areas and contribute to ‘Free and open Indo-Pacific.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Indo-Japan relationship stands on a solid foundation, thanks to the initiatives of Abe and his counterpart. Japan is a special country and has both annual summit progress and 2+2 ministerial dialogue.</td>
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The two nations share the same values of an open and accessible Indo-Pacific region and have similar concerns of expansionist China, which bind them together. Also, closeness with the USA and Australia in terms of strategic goals are additional reasons for Japan to engage deeply with India.

### Challenges

The relations between India and Japan have some ‘misses’ as well. Some issues linger in the Japanese establishment, which include trade balance and progress in transfer of cutting-edge technology. For several years, Japan and India have been in negotiation for US-2 amphibious aircraft. The Indian side has withdrawn from the deal citing cost and technology transfer issues, and the deal has yet to be finalised. Similarly, there are concerns over the timely completion of High Speed (Bullet) Trains for which ODA loans are provided at the cheapest rate. No other country other than India has received such extensive aid in a single project from Japan.

Further, withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) at the last minute has dented the hopes of Japanese policymakers and the business community. India’s participation in RCEP was critical to challenge China’s domination. Japan still awaits and hopes for India to join RCEP. Due to India’s RCEP gamble, India has shifted to the periphery in the Japanese corporate focus, whereas China and Southeast Asia hold the centre position. In the current COVID-19 pandemic, Japanese corporations are still sceptical about investing in India.
Conclusion

Abe worked holistically with both the regimes of Manmohan Singh and Modi, placing India at the centre of Japan’s global engagement. Similarly, both Indian Prime Ministers religiously reciprocated Abe’s efforts, where Abe-Modi relations developed into a unique personal bond.

However, the new political landscape tells a whole new story. Suga will put his energy into consolidating his political position within the LDP’s multiple factions and winning the next general election in October 2021. Suga’s term will expire in the coming four months, making it essential for him to win the LDP presidency to continue as Prime Minister or else face the problem of the ‘revolving door’ Prime Minister that Japan faced during 2006-12.

As Delhi gears up for the post-Abe leadership, India’s ascendency in Japan’s strategic framework will endure and outlive the Abe administration. It is India’s turn now to do some heavy lifting for nurturing and solidifying the bilateral relations. India must go beyond government-to-government engagement. The need of the hour is focusing on creating more attractive platforms for Japanese corporations to relocate from China and diversifying supply chains to India. Indian commentator Jagannath Panda optimistically noted the complementarities of Indo-Japan economic relations, which both nations can leverage under “Suganomics” (Panda, 2020). Even though India has a limited capacity to absorb the investment, India must seize the opportunities provided by shifting Japanese business entities to diversify its investment portfolio. Even though the defence and security cooperation and strategic convergence have been fast paced between Indian and Japan, intensified economic cooperation and transfer of technology are essential for the relationship to be enduring. There is no going back in Indo-Japan relations primarily because the variables that pushed India and Japan closer are still changing dynamically. The question is whether India and Japan are up to the challenge.

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Article -III

Chinese Military Adventurism and Assertive Behaviour

Arjun*

Abstract

China’s expansionist vision has led to the violation of its neighbouring countries’ territories, antagonising many Indo-Pacific member states. Beijing’s resolution to unilaterally change the physical status quo in the South China Sea (SCS), and in the Himalayan plains has resulted in military stand-offs and clashes, while exacerbating China’s bilateral relations. China’s belligerent adventurism in the SCS has triggered several flashpoints and consequently, tensions have escalated in the region. China’s highhandedness as well as aggressive posturing in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh has led to the culmination of one of the biggest bloody military clashes between India and China since 1962. India has responded to China’s belligerence in a befitting manner that has rattled its adversary by using various tools of statecraft to stage its strong displeasure and signalled that it will no longer cow down to any sort of pressure.

Keywords: Adventurism, aggression, conflict, economic independence, expansionism, military development, and status quo.

From the cold arid mountains in the Himalayan plains, to further south in the Indian Ocean and far east to the East China Sea and SCS, China has been flexing its muscle and exercising its belligerent and aggressive expansionist posture to alter the territorial and maritime status quo unilaterally by its military. This deliberate hostile act, which has gone against the grain for several Indo-Pacific member countries including India and America, has united the ASEAN member states to raise voices against Beijing’s rising hostilities in the SCS. In the recently concluded 36th ASEAN Summit on June 26, 2020 the South East Asian nations have unanimously condemned China of not respecting and abiding by the 1982 United Nations Oceans’ treaty, and of repeatedly violating the international maritime norms with the intent to unilaterally iron out its maritime differences in the region. In a press statement post the summit, the Southeast Asian Association stated, “We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones... The UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out.”

Furthermore, the ASEAN leaders stressed the importance of the use of self-restraint to ensure that maritime disputes be resolved peacefully and amicably in accordance with the existing international legal framework, while maintaining peace and stability in the region. They strongly opposed China’s use of military force to acquire and reclaim territories in disputed regions based on historical narratives and articulated that such actions would not only exacerbate hostilities between the member countries and China, but also entail towards the de-stabilisation of regional maritime peace.

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Likewise, China has threatened to disrupt the peaceful order in the Himalayan plains while attempting to unilaterally change the territorial status quo and by illegally laying claims over territories in countries like Bhutan, India, Myanmar, and Nepal. Amid the border tension with India, China has made new claims over Eastern Bhutan to which the latter rebuffed. Unlike the verbal duel with Bhutan, China encroached into India’s sovereign territory across the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) into the Union Territory of Ladakh, claiming it to be theirs, but were opposed and pushed back by the Indian armed forces. This unprovoked act of aggression cost India 20 brave lives including 76 soldiers who sustained major and minor injuries. Countries that are regarded as Beijing’s allies have also suffered the same fate as the other Indo-Pacific countries under China’s expansionist policy. In a recent development, Myanmar has come forward indirectly accusing China of hatching a nefarious plot to destabilise the country from within by supplying state of art weapons to insurgent groups along the Myanmar China border. Nepal, a long-term political ally of Beijing, has surrendered territories to China, including an entire village in the district of Gorkha along with 11 strategic areas and still chooses to remain completely mute over the illegal occupations of its territories. Despite China’s treacherous acts, Nepal, in show of support, has gone to the extent of raising anti-India protests under Beijing’s instructions.

**China Muscling Its Way Through the Disputed Territories**

The ASEAN members’ concern comes at a time when China has announced its intention of conducting a five-day military drill around the Paracel Islands in the SCS, a disputed territory between Vietnam and China. This military exercise has been termed as “highly provocative” by Philippines and has been viewed as a violation of territorial sovereignty by Vietnam which could bear adverse implications for Beijing’s ties with ASEAN. Along the lines of aggression, China’s attempt to unilaterally change the territorial status quo in Galwan Valley, in the Union Territory of Ladakh has culminated in an eight-week long military stand-off between India and China, where both armies are presently battle-ready on either side of the front.

While the stand-off continues to persist, the Chinese Navy has augmented its activities in SCS, raising security concerns for the regional member states. At the time of the fatal clashes in the Galwan Valley, Chinese submarines were spotted navigating through the Japanese waters, and in response Japan scrambled its jets and warships to locate and monitor the surreptitious movements of the foreign submersible. The age-old territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands has revived due to the daily presence and activities of Chinese vessels near the islands since mid-April, causing a growing hostility between the two countries. Additionally, Chinese combat aircrafts along with bombers have been regularly spotted breaching the Taiwan airspace in an act to claim and project Taiwan as an integral part of China since the time Taiwan’s President, Tsai-Ing Wen declared Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, openly denouncing and refuting China’s claim, and its ‘one country two systems’ policy.

Moreover, Taiwan’s announcement, to conduct its annual live-fire drill and military exercise in the month of July and September this year with the sole purpose of deterring Chinese forces from landing on its shores, has chagrined Beijing. In a riposte, Beijing deployed additional squadrons of fighter jets and warships near the Taiwan Strait, while augmenting its maritime patrol and air activities in and around the island nation. To
acquire full control over Taiwan, China has resorted to the “island encirclement” strategy, an offensive military exercise that involves routine military drills around the island nation. In an extension of this strategy, earlier this year in April, a flotilla of Chinese warships including an aircraft carrier cruised close to Taiwan in a show of strength, signalling explicitly Beijing’s intent to take control of Taiwan by force. Following the incident on May 29, 2020, Li Zuocheng, the Chinese Chief of Joint Staff Department, confirmed that China is determined to use all the necessary means and resources available at its disposal to thwart Taiwan from gaining its self-determination. He stated, “If the possibility for peaceful reunification is lost, the people’s armed forces will, with the whole nation, including the people of Taiwan, take all the necessary steps to resolutely smash any separatist plots or actions... We do not promise to abandon the use of force, and reserve the option to take all necessary measures, to stabilise and control situation in the Taiwan Strait.” Beijing has unequivocally stated that it will not hesitate to use its military force to seize Taiwan, if required.

Since Beijing made its intentions clear vis-à-vis its stance on Taiwan, the United States (U.S) was forced to intervene to protect the democratic national interest of its ally and intensified its military activities around the island to safeguard Taiwanese sovereignty and national interests.

In yet another act of provocation and aggression by the Chinese, a Vietnamese fishing boat was sunk by a Chinese vessel in the disputed waters of the SCS in the Paracel Islands, sometime in the first week of April of this year. Philippines, a cordial partner of China, came to the support of Vietnam and condemned the Chinese for their aggressive posture and expressed their “deep concern” over the incident. Philippines reminded China of a similar incident that occurred last year, where a Filipino fishing trawler was sunk by a Chinese vessel in the contentious Reed Bank area, leaving 22 Filipino fishermen stranded in the open sea, until a Vietnamese boat came to their rescue. The Philippines foreign ministry stated that “Our similar experience revealed how much trust in a friendship is lost by it, and how much trust was created by Vietnam’s humanitarian act of directly saving the lives of our Filipino fishermen.”

In the same vein, earlier this year Chinese and Malaysian vessels wrangled in the SCS for a month, before the latter drillship returned to its waters after completing its task. A Malaysian state-run oil corporate drillship was exploring for maritime resources in the contested waters claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam, and China near Borneo Island. While the ship was exploring the waters, it encountered a Chinese Survey Ship escorted by a couple Chinese Coast Guard vessels that harassed the Malaysian vessel. As a countervail, Malaysia deployed its naval ships to negotiate the threat. In addition, America sent its warships to the scene as additional force for the Malaysian Navy. Beijing, in defence of its aggression, stated that its survey vessel was merely conducting routine naval activities in the area which falls under its control.

Clearly, the littoral nations in the SCS region have grown indignant at the atrocities committed by the Chinese, leading to attenuated relations. The military presence of the United States in the region has provided some sort of comfort and reassurance against the Chinese belligerence. The interception of the United States and its increasing military presence and activity in the SCS has amplified the military competition and exacerbated regional tensions in the area, as China attempts to militarily engage and
commensurate by gaining a strategic mileage over its adversary. As China uses its militarily muscle to illegally alter and expand its territorial and maritime boundaries, it only provides an opportunity for all the Indo-Pacific member countries to unite and form a strategic alliance to confront Chinese hegemony and coerce China to adhere to the international conventions and hold Beijing accountable for its aggressive and hostile acts.

Beijing is seen to be pursuing and exercising coercive strategy in the SCS by deploying intimidating tactics on its maritime neighbours which has exponentially increased the likelihood of conflict in the region. The principal motive behind Beijing’s unrestrained hostile tactics is the drive to acquire and seize the entire maritime energy resources in the region and to subsequently take complete control over the vital maritime trade routes. To galvanise the process of acquiring these natural resources, China is building artificial islands and militarising them by equipping the islands with radar systems airfields and harbours. These islands act as listening posts for the Chinese to monitor and interdict exploratory activities by foreign countries, as well as expand its outreach all over the SCS. The rising number of maritime confrontations in the region is the effect of Chinese intimidating tactics coupled with the commissioning of large number of fleets of coast guard and fishing trawlers aimed at harassing foreign vessels.

Shifting focus from the SCS to the Himalayan plains, one has witnessed similar hostility and menacing tactics deployed by the Chinese around their frontiers. China’s new claim over the Eastern region of Bhutan has been strongly rebutted. In a firm reply to Beijing, Bhutan has proclaimed that the Eastern region has not once been under contestation between the two countries in the past and that the region is indisputably an integral and sovereign territory of Bhutan. This baseless claim over Bhutan’s territory has come in the backdrop of China’s stand-off with India and is viewed as an attempt to harass and torment countries that are standing by India against China. In 2017, in an attempt to intrude into Bhutan, China encroached into Doklam, a trijunction point where Bhutan, China and India share borders, but were stopped by the Indian troops, resulting in a fierce two-month long stand-off before reinstating the status quo ante. China has been pushing the envelope far too often, with the intent to alter the status quo among the smaller nations, as it finds it convenient to coerce them to act in accordance with its own interests.

Discussing about intrusions, the Chinese Army had attempted to encroach into Indian sovereign territory across the disputed LAC in the Galwan Valley, in the Union Territory of Ladakh. It was fiercely opposed by the Indian troops while attempting to unilaterally change the status quo in several disputed areas. This military adventurism displayed by the Chinese has culminated in an intense military stand-off for over two months between the two countries which has not only witnessed bloodshed, expedited military build-up in a show of strength but has also included several rounds of diplomatic and military dialogues at various levels, to diffuse and disengage the escalating tension. Having reached a mutual agreement over military de-escalation and disengagement in disputed areas on June 14, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops and pull down all infrastructure in the designated points. However, China diverged from the agreement by laying an ambush on an Indian patrolling unit that was out to overlook whether the PLA had complied with the military agreement. To the unit’s surprise it found Chinese infrastructure still erected in the area. In compliance with the mutual
agreement, the patrolling party began to dismantle the Chinese infrastructure when they were suddenly and deliberately attacked by the Chinese. In the ambush, 20 Indian soldiers lost their lives and many others sustained serious injuries, not before giving the Chinese a bloody nose. According to the U.S intelligence reports and Indian military reports, China has sustained higher casualty than India and these reports have been recently confirmed by a recent statement issued by a PLA veteran in China.

The bloody debacle has exacerbated India-China relations and has culminated in a war-like situation on either side of the LAC, where the two militaries have rapidly stepped up their deployment on a war scale to stare each other down. China’s expansionist posture and hostility in the Union territory of Ladakh is a reaction of India’s speedy strategic infrastructural development, along the LAC and on the India-China border that facilitates rapid deployment of troops and military artillery to forward positions. The strategic border development project along the India-China border, not only provides the Indian armed forces easy access to the most remote areas along the LAC and the MacMohan Line, which was otherwise absent, but also mitigates the strategic vulnerability on the borders for want of prior surveillance capabilities. With better road connectivity and infrastructure, the Indian border security forces are enabled to carry out regular, rigorous, and deep patrols while enhancing its surveillance activities along the frontiers which has displeased the Chinese as it interferes and compromises its ‘Forward Policy’ and also eliminates the strategic edge over its counterpart.

Moreover, India’s recent act to reorganise the state of Jammu and Kashmir has not gone well with China, as it lays illegal claims over several parts of the Union Territory of Ladakh. Earlier this year, New Delhi issued a demarche to Pakistan, instructing it to vacate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), since it rightfully belongs to India. Following this demarche, China grew wary of India’s intent and was perturbed that any such move by New Delhi, could jeopardise the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion-dollar economic project in POK. Keeping in view these points, China has resorted to exercise offensive measures against India to deter the latter from affecting its national interests.

In contrast to Bhutan and India, Myanmar has always maintained a steady and healthy relation with Beijing. Despite that, Myanmar has articulated its displeasure with China’s recent involvement in its internal affairs by aiding terror outfits. Myanmar has alleged that insurgent groups within Myanmar are economically funded and are equipped by a “foreign country” which is none other than China. These allegations were recently made after the Myanmar military seized a large cache of sophisticated weapons made in China from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. Many of the terror outfits operate in the Myanmar-China border and hence get regular supply of arms and ammunition from the country.

China is believed to be meddling in the internal affairs of Myanmar, to promote and kickstart its One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI) in the country. According to intelligence reports, China is equipping, training, and funding a militia of 23,000 men called the United Wa State Army who are conversant with Mandarin and who operate on the Myanmar China border. The purpose to support armed insurgency in Myanmar is to create an environment for political instability. Having created a conducive environment to intervene and act as a peace negotiator between the Myanmar government and the
terror outfits, it will earn the politico-diplomatic credibility in the foreign government. In doing so, it will gradually infiltrate into the functioning of the state affairs and influence the decision makers to converge the state’s interests with Chinese interests. Bearing in mind, China’s art of political brinkmanship, Myanmar needs to be wary of China’s immediate and long-term strategy.

Discussing China’s long-term strategy and expansionist attitude, Nepal, a close ally of Communist China, has ironically suffered the most in terms of land ceded. In a latest development on June 24, China occupied an entire village in the district of Gorkha, Nepal, by simply dismantling the boundary pillars and extending them further into the Nepalese territory, and thereby legitimising the newly acquired territory as their own. Excluding this village, China has already seized 11 other strategic areas across the country, amounting to 33 hectares. Despite such outrage, the Nepal Government has been reticent regarding the land relinquished to the Chinese which delineates the current government’s political position vis-à-vis China.

**China’s Hegemonic Ambitions**

China’s highhandedness and expansionist posture both on land and on water has created profound unrest and has strained relations with most of its neighbouring countries including India. China’s ability to assert itself in the maritime front is a result of its steadfast maritime enterprise and its single pointed focus of transforming from a regional hegemony to a global hegemony. The capability of building the largest number of warships in the world has led China, to expand its maritime interests and claims beyond the East China Sea, SCS into the Indian Ocean, more than ever. China is resorting to the use of force to keep itself abreast with its expanding national and economic interests. This ambitious expansion by the Chinese in the East and South China Sea are essentially economic and energy centric, driven by the desire to monopolise the entire regional maritime trade routes, while paving way to eventually control and dominate the adjacent oceans.

In the context of the adventurism over land, Beijing has sought to consolidate and assert its position at various strategic points where it intends to build a trade route connecting the BRI infrastructure along with its economic corridor which would then enable a free flow of trade and commerce over land from the Easternmost region of China to the Western part of the Indian Ocean, through the Gwadar Port. However, to execute its plan, China needs India’s cooperation, to help facilitate the completion of the project, as it is strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Since, it has failed to convince the latter of the BRI over its existing territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, China has resorted to use coercion to unilaterally alter its status quo in the Himalayan plains.

China’s desire to project itself as a global power has been explicitly characterised in the promotion of the “G2” model. The concept being that China and America, two equal powers would share the global community in two spheres, reviving a colonial-style hierarchic structure. This Chinese narrative is veiled with the intention of making America recognise China as an equal, while covertly harbouring the resolution of eventually displacing it as a global super-power. This “G2” model cannot prevail for the simple reason being that Communist China is politically too ambitious and is
uninterested in collective work. Moreover, Beijing perceives the Asian order as a hierarchy, through the currency of power politics and places itself at the helm of the structure since it regards itself as a natural superior power. It opposes the construct of an equal partner, as it seeks to transform from a regional power to a global hegemon.

Additionally, China’s national security narrative treats America as its primary threat. This argument is substantiated by observing the concentration of the Chinese military strength on the Eastern front facing the SCS, with the intent of engaging the Americans in the region. Its entire strategic construct is directed towards displacing the United States as a global economic and military power. By doing so, it will achieve its goal of projecting itself as a global super-power and therewith, control the global hierarchy. It seeks to achieve this endeavour by the year 2049, to earmark and commemorate 100 years of Communist rule in China. To realise its ambitious drive within the stipulated time, Beijing has sought to consolidate and bulwark its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region, by resorting to the use of military might before heading into the extra regional domains.

In the attempt to consolidate its primacy in the region, China must negotiate its regional threat. As per the Chinese discourse, India is perceived to be an obstruction for its regional aspirations due to multiple factors, namely, its growing economy, military capability, geo-strategic positioning, clashing of regional interests and its increasing regional and global influence. The ongoing military standoff over territorial disputes in Union Territory of Ladakh and its longstanding claim over the state of Arunachal Pradesh has further stymied and challenged China’s primacy in the region.

Besides using coercive action, Beijing has devised an economic strategy to expand its geo-strategic footprint up to the African continent. Under its grand economic strategy, Beijing offers loans to developing countries by supporting in the construction and development of their infrastructure. China not only provides monetary assistance but also manpower for infrastructure development which leads to the reduction of local employment opportunities in the respective countries. The economic aid programme offered by China is not intended for the betterment and upliftment of developing states, but is, in reality, a strategic manoeuvre to help foray into the country, to gain access to its natural resources and paralyse the local market by flooding it with its cheap goods. Unable to repay the exorbitant loans with its due interest, countries fall into the Chinese debt-trap and are compelled to surrender their strategic assets and infrastructure underlease as compensation and subsequently fall under Chinese control. By doing so, China establishes its footprint beyond its regional periphery. Using this geostrategic economic model, it has extended its footprint into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and has created a “String of Pearls” around India to curtail and limit its influence within the subcontinent, while it flourishes further west of the Indian Ocean, towards East Africa. Aligning with its strategic interest of dominating the IOR, China has enhanced its naval presence and activities in the ocean and has developed listening posts and naval and military installations in and around the IOR to safeguard its economic and security stakes in the region.
India’s Multi-Prong Response to Tame China’s Pugnaciousness

The recent unprovoked bloody clashes that occurred in the Galwan Valley due to China’s deceitful act has prompted India to take unprecedented stringent countermeasures against Beijing economically, technologically, and militarily. In response to the clashes on June 15, 2020, between India and China, the Indian Government has recently banned 59 Chinese apps in a “digital airstrike”, citing the safety and security of India’s digital data. Chinese apps are used as backchannels for gathering individuals’ data from countries of strategic interest, monitoring the political and social behaviour of its competitors, and influencing decision makers to converge with its own interests. The National Intelligence Law (2017) permits China’s intelligence office to gain unlimited access to all restricted facilities and gather private records, data, and communications of consumers from both the domestic and foreign commercial institutions in China. Therefore, by banning these Chinese apps the Indian Government has not only countered snooping activities and prevented violation of privacy but has also assured the integrity of its technological sovereignty.

As part of its economic offensive on China, India has cancelled several major multi-billion-dollar telecommunication, railway, and infrastructural investment projects with China. It has also banned the import of power equipment including a couple of its e-commerce platforms namely Club Factory and Shein. Emulating the Indian initiative of boycotting Chinese investments, the U.S has recently banned Chinese Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corp, citing national security threats and proposed to substitute the telecom equipment and networks with domestic ones. This economic strike has rattled the Chinese, as India is an important market for Chinese goods and services and this move has made China incur a heavy loss of several billion dollars. In a push towards Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India), Prime Minister Modi has pitched for indigenous production of goods and services while advocating the boycott of Chinese products in India. This initiative has stimulated the development of an indigenous economic hub for local produce of goods and services while resuscitating its parent idea of “Make in India.” With Chinese apps being scrapped from the country, it has provided opportunities for the domestic software industry to enter the technological innovation race and substitute the digital dependence and void created by the Chinese apps.

In conjunction with the digital and economic strike on Beijing, India has reinforced its military presence on the LAC, in the Eastern Theatre of Ladakh by operationalising three army divisions and deploying specialised mountain units including several tank squads, artillery, mechanised infantry squads and air defence missile systems to respond in equal measure with the Chinese military fortification and to deter any further military adventurism. Apart from the army, the Indian Air Force has operationalised squadrons of Apache attack helicopters and squadrons of upgraded Mig-29s and Sukhoi-30s MKI at the Leh airbase. Amidst the standoff with China, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on July 2, 2020, has approved the procurement of military hardware to bulwark the operational capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces. Converging with the principle of Atmanirbhar Bharat, the MoD has invested Rs 31,482 crores of the total budget of Rs 39,800 crores in the indigenous defence industry. The procurement includes 21 Mig-29 aircrafts from Russia along with the upgradation of the existing 59 Mig-29s for Rs 7,418 crores. The government will also procure 12 Sukhoi-30 MKI from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, for a price of Rs 10,730 crores. The rest of the budget has been used for the
development and production of the indigenous rocket system, long range land attack cruise missile systems, purchase of ammunition, Astra air-to-air missiles for the Indian Air Force and Navy, upgradation of the BMP armament and the purchase of software Defined radio system for the army. Awaiting the arrival of the first batch of the 36 Rafale fighter aircrafts from France later this month and the approval of procuring and upgrading the existing Russian aircrafts, the Indian Air Force will see a rise in the number of fighter squadrons and provide teeth to the overall air capabilities.

Deepening Diplomatic Ties

On July 3, 2020, the Indian Prime Minister visited Leh to take stock of the situation near the LAC, meeting and interacting with the injured soldiers who were involved in the bloody fracas with the Chinese while expressing his support and gratitude. During his address he stated, ‘The age of expansionism is over, now it is the Age of Development’, indirectly hinting at China. In a communication to the world community, he stated that India’s show of strength is to only maintain peace, while India’s progress is for the benefit and betterment of the world.

Following the address, Japan has sought to extend its cooperation with India and wished to deepen its strategic ties by offering to share defence intelligence with partners such as India, Australia, and the United Kingdom by amending its secrets law. In doing so, it could enable and facilitate information exchange of Chinese military movements in the region with its partners. This proposal comes weeks after India had signed the Mutual Logistics Support and communication sharing agreement with Australia for enhancing maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific against China’s maritime aggression. This pact facilitates the access of logistical support for a country’s military in its partnering country, while also providing the Indian Navy and the Airforce a greater outreach in the Pacific. This strategic partnership will lead to several joint exercises, training missions and joint operations between the two militaries. Additionally, both countries have signed to collaborate in defence science, technological research, and cyber technology. This strategic cooperation between the two countries not only signals to Beijing their intent of collaborating and ensuring a free, safe and ‘rules-based maritime order’ in the region but also of India’s entry into the Indo-Pacific region.

India has signed similar logistical support pacts with the United States and France which permits the refuelling and refitting of the military platforms at each other’s bases around the globe. As far as the agreement regarding the communication of intelligence is concerned, both America and France are pro-active with their Indian counterpart. Japan’s move to share its defence intelligence with India culminates in the completion of the Quad in terms of military between America, Australia, India, and Japan.

A combined institutional effort is imperative to deter and curb China’s bold adventurism in the Indo-Pacific region. Along with bilateral efforts, multilateral approaches need to be adopted to signal Beijing that such impudent expansionist behaviour will not be permissible. China needs to learn to respect and tread along a ‘rules-based’ international order, to resolve its mutual differences with its neighbours as well as with other states, rather than attempting to unilaterally change the status quo using coercion. In case China fails to comply with the international order, it needs to be held accountable for its actions. One of the effective ways to address the situation is to
strengthen the cooperation of the existing regional multilateral institutions by not only being more supportive of each other but also being more vocal and decisive against Chinese belligerence and adventurism. Regional institutions like ASEAN and BIMSTEC need to operate beyond the short-term individual parochial interests, to form a larger common long-term strategy for the collective well-being and security against Chinese adventurism. The members of the regional institutions need to be more vocal and unanimous in their stand against China when it violates the international norms or threatens the interest of any of the regional member states without fearing the consequence of their bilateral relation with the latter. They need to step up and reinforce the collective security apparatus to safeguard not only one another’s national interests but simultaneously ensuring the protection of the regional interests.

An effective response to the Chinese aggression is to strike where it hurts China most which is Beijing’s under-belly - its economy. India’s economic riposte of banning 59 apps including the cancellation of several major government multi-billion-dollar investment projects - while giving an opportunity for indigenisation - has shaken the Chinese dominant position on the economic front. In the process of promoting indigenisation in the country, not only does India develop a self-reliant market but also reduces its dependence on the Chinese goods and services without having to compromise on its core national interests. Furthermore, it entails not only doing away with Chinese goods and services but also puts an end to the arm twisting that is involved because of overdependence on its products. Following India’s initiative, America too has banned Chinese telecommunication investments in the country and is proposing to ban more apps and investments in the days to come. The regional multilateral institutions could take a leaf out of India’s book, to reduce its economic dependence on China and develop a pro-active commerce between the institutional members while extending its trade with other major countries in the region. ASEAN member countries should look to foster stronger economic relations with countries like Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., to marginalise its economic reliance over China. In doing so, it could eliminate the chances of China bullying the smaller countries into acting under duress. If more countries come together to boycott Chinese products and investments, it will have a substantial impact on China’s economy, and affect proportionally its military expenditure and dent its military capabilities.

In the wake of China’s adventurism on land and in the seas, it is imperative that the Quad and ASEAN enhance their strategic and defence cooperation with long term goals vis-à-vis China. The two regional institutions need to design a regional strategy to deter Chinese expansionism by initiating and engaging in joint military exercises, sharing of military intelligence, and jointly collaborating in developing the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” and the “Blue Dot Network” initiatives as counter to the BRI. Taking forward the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” and “Blue Dot Network” initiatives, would synthesise the ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific members’ interests by providing an economic impetus, freedom of navigation, and establishing rule of law and ensuring peace and security in the region against the Chinese onslaught.
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Ownership Relations in the Development Trend of Sharing Economy in Vietnam

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ABSTRACT
Sharing economy is a term that has been discussed a lot on e-commerce forums in Vietnam recently. This is a new business model that can bring super profits along with general benefits to society on the digital economy platform. The sharing economy is a new opportunity to change the way of doing business from owning assets to using assets without owning. In the past, the possession of physical-production materials or consumption materials was the most important factor in assessing the efficiency of enterprises or the quality of life, but the trend nowadays has changed. Throughout the industrial revolutions from the first to the fourth ones, the production force has had a remarkable development from mechanics, electrification, electronics, computers, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing... The influence of the fourth industrial revolution and the emergence of the sharing economy leads to the appearance of a new generation who prefer the consuming experience of possessing material. Along with that trend, the production relationship, including the ownership, also has certain changes such as the subjects and objects of the ownership, the new perception of ownership... Changes in ownership, when the sharing economy is formed and developed in Vietnam, has raised many problems such as changes in ownership objects in sharing economies require a complete institutional foundation of management; property rights, especially intellectual property; means and ways to evaluate and measure the efficiency and profitability of enterprises pursuing the form of "sharing economy". Henceforth, the article proposes several implications for solving problems that arise in ownership when developing the sharing economy in Vietnam, that is: completing the institution; providing a full and flexible legal environment; creating conditions for the effective development and management of subjects participating in the sharing economic model, consistent with the rapid change of science and technology platform; renewing the intellectual property regime in the direction of encouraging creativity and protecting property rights in all fields; building a system of means and methods for economic accounting and information transparency in the sharing economy; enhancing understanding of subjects when participating in the sharing economy; having a management mechanism to protect legal rights and interests as well as personal property.

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Keywords: Sharing economy, ownership, ownership relation, changes in ownership relation, changes in ownership relation of Vietnam, the solutions for Vietnam

1. Introduction

The sharing economy was conceptualized in 1995, starting in the US with the initial model of "peer sharing" but not clear. It started with the advertising rental website service, job seekers, job hunting ... and helped individuals to find jobs then earned advertising money. This business model developed strongly when the US economy fell into crisis in 2008 as people were forced to change their consumption patterns to adapt to difficult circumstances. The "sharing" of available resources using technology applications has brought huge profits for all service providers as well as tenants and resource users; henceforth, this business model has soared beyond American borders, spread across Europe and the world.

From a macro perspective, the sharing economy is where available resources are exploited collectively among users via a technology platform. The sharing economy is well known in Vietnam when two big companies in the world, Uber and Grab, entered the market in 2014. According to research by Nielsen in some Southeast Asian countries, the Vietnamese are ready to use a shared product and ready to share, especially electronics, then lessons, cars, motorbikes, and housing. According to the survey, 3 out of 4 Vietnamese respondents said they liked the business idea about this model and 76% said they were willing to take advantage of products and services under this model. Under the influence of the 4th industrial revolution, along with the Government encouraging the building of an innovative business community, the explosion of startups in the sharing economy model in Vietnam is likely to happen very soon. In a sharing economy, vehicles, other assets including goods, services, space, skills, and money can all be shared. The emergence of new business models and new cooperation models has created many new problems, including ownership relations in the digital age. The content of the article will focus on the following issues: (1) Changes in ownership relations under the impact of the sharing economy (2) Issues in terms of ownership relations in the sharing economy; (3) Some implications for solving problems that arise in ownership relations when developing the sharing economy in Vietnam.

2. Content
2.1. Overview of the birth of the sharing economy

Definition of sharing economy

A sharing economy - a connection model where consumers can make use of each other’s redundant resources - is a model with high economic value, significant impact on consumers as well as a traditional business.

A sharing economy, also known as a peer economy/a mesh economy/a collaborative economy/collaborative consumption is a socio-economic system built on the sharing of

2 Thu Hương: "Sức mạnh của nền kinh tế chia sẻ". Theo TTVN/The Economist, Báo Tin mới online.
human and material resources. It includes sharing in the creation, production, distribution, trade, and consumption of goods and services by different individuals and organizations. These formations may have manifold configuration, but in the end, they use the power of information technology to benefit individuals, companies, NGOs, governments, which allows them to distribute, share and reuse excess resources of goods or services. The common premise for the sharing economy is that when information about goods is shared, the value of goods and services will increase, for both businesses, individuals, and communities.

Collaborative consumption is a phenomenon where there are a series of economic accords that allow those who agree to participate to share the connection to a product or service, rather than to own it individually. Usually, this model is supported by technology and peer communities. The collaborative consumer model is often used by an electronic platform like eBay, Craigslist, and Krrb, in emerging industries such as social lending, peer-to-peer accommodation, peer-to-peer travel experiences, peer-to-peer job assignments, travel advice, travel-sharing by car, or travel-sharing by bus.

A mesh economy is an economic model based on the sharing of meshes of people, goods, and services. This model is supported by technology that enables more efficient connections between people, goods, and services, creating new communities, organizations, or business models in the public and economic sectors. Private sector. Technologies such as mobile devices, social networks, the Internet, connected communities, 3D printers, and sensors allow individuals and organizations to directly share available resources rather than waiting third party companies or the government to provide the goods or services that you want.

The person-to-person model, also known as the peer-to-peer model, creates new opportunities for individuals, communities, governments, and corporations to trade and cooperate. The Mesh Economy was first introduced by Lisa Gansky in her book The Mesh: Why the Future of Business is Sharing.

There are many different definitions of the sharing economy. According to Yuhei Okakita, Deputy Director of the Economic Information Policy Division - Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, sharing economy is an economic reconstruction, in which anonymous individuals can use idle assets (including intangible assets such as personal skills and free time) owned by other individuals via combined Internet platforms. According to economic experts, shared economics is a term referring to a business model that exploits the resources available to the end-user and combines with technological elements to form one business model. In addition, the sharing economy is also understood as a "hybrid market" model (between owning and giving gifts), which refers to the sharing of access to goods and services (coordinated through community-based online services).

Although there are many different definitions of the sharing economy, in general, all definitions show that the nature of the sharing economy model is to utilize the development of digital technology to save on delivery costs and reach many customers through digital platforms. The basic feature of the sharing economy model is the use of
digital technology applications to provide information to individuals and organizations. From there, it allows optimization of resources through the redistribution, sharing, and reuse of redundant capacities of goods and services. To share resources, new goods and services as well as new industries in the sharing economy, three basic elements are required: (i) Customer behaviour for many goods and services changes from owning to sharing; (ii) Online social networks and electronic markets are easy to link with consumers; (iii) Mobile devices and electronic services make the use of shared goods and services more convenient.

Based on the form of asset owner and price decision-maker, the sharing economy model is generally divided into three main categories: (i) Centralized platform model (platform providers are asset owners and service cost decision-makers); (ii) Decentralized platform model (the platform providers create only the connected environment, the service provider is the owner of the asset and also the decision-makers of the service cost); (iii) The hybrid platform model (the asset owner provides the service at the price given by the platform and the platform also plays a role in ensuring the quality of the product delivered out of the market).

Participants in the sharing economic model are very diverse. There could be an individual user, a non-profit business, a for-profit business, a local community, or the public sector. The sharing economy allows consumers to access services and assets that they cannot own as well as help improve social welfare. It also makes the most use of physical assets and other idle resources, contributes to cost savings, sustainable economic development, and reduces negative environmental impacts. With these great benefits, the sharing economy has become an indispensable part of the global economy. Thus, the sharing economy (other names are the collaborative economy, the mesh...) is an economic system that promotes sharing and cooperation over private ownership.

People, instead of possessing to satisfy their needs, will find resources in the community. The sharing economy is growing because it redistributes resources that are not being used effectively (products that are bought but not used, machines are underutilized) to where it could be used more efficiently. In a society where cars are used on average 1 hour per day (less than 5% of the time), 99% of appliances are not used again in six months. This redistribution is necessary to save money on users and social resources.

**Overview of the advent of the sharing economy**
In fact, the sharing model has been around for a long time: library, car rental, club, practice room, motorbike taxi, sharing in villages and towns. However, since the mid-twentieth century, sharing had become more expensive and complicated than owning, due to the explosion of mass production (the industrial revolution). Since then, consumerism is formed on the idea that consumption will help people feel happy, consumption helps the economy thrive. But now the trend is reversed again, as sharing becomes cheaper.

The sharing economy is on a larger trend that dates to the Internet era: The reversing trend of consumerism. Thanks to the spread of the Internet, e-commerce sites like eBay and Craigslist helped connect resource-minded people willing to share resources and
those in need more efficiently. Resource sharing and redistribution began to go cheaper than buying new and throwing away old. People are not only buyers but can also sell through peer-to-peer commerce. This enables the wasted things that are not used to be utilized through the technology platform. Through this platform, people begin to change relationships with things they own, they realize what can be accessed without having to own, which is expensive to maintain, which is not needed. Equipment that is not used often should be rented, not be purchased. This changes the mentality of "private ownership".

Product Service companies started developing a fee-for-use, rather than per-ownership (ZipCar) model 10 years ago. Now there are hundreds of sharing-asset companies: Airbnb, RelayRides, DogVacay, LiquidSpace... These companies use the technology of mobile phones, GPS, 3G, online payments to make the sharing economy model work with high efficiency, cost savings, benefits increase for suppliers, needers, and middlemen. At the same time, they also save capital (not buying cars, building hotels) by using community capital (participant's car, participant's house), which helps companies to spread quickly around the world.

In summary: The sharing economy is an expression of the technology adoption to reduce waste in consumption, target smart cities and communities, and effectively utilize resources.

2.2. Ownership relations changes under the impact of the sharing economy
Ownership is the social relations arising between people in the "possession" of matter. In the sharing economy, the ownership relationship is also the relationship between people in the process of "sharing" resources. Therefore, there have been new changes in the ownership relationship, namely:

First, change in the object of ownership
Before the fourth industrial revolution, the object of ownership was always the main means of production such as capital and machinery. The subjects of ownership play a decisive role in the relationship with other entities in the production and business process. As time goes by, the sharing economy, along with the application of digital technology, plays an increasingly important role in production and business, whereas the position of the financial capital factor tends to decrease and be replaced by information technology businesses, which hold data about consumers' needs, preferences, finance... The world will witness a spectacular overthrow of information technology businesses when they turn manufacturing businesses into their "henchmen". With the ability to collect and analyze data, information technology businesses will grasp the needs of their customers and produce corresponding products. Then they will hire a manufacturing company to make products for them. Therefore, the era of a "coup" in production is approaching, not all businesses hold the production line.

Under the impact of the sharing economy, owning intangible assets is more and more important than tangible assets. (Tangible assets: factories, machinery, products, goods in circulation, and inventory... Intangible assets include intellectual property (ideas, design, research - development, databases, brands, reputation, strategies, business
processes, customer relations...) and intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs...)

While intangible assets increasingly offer high value with low fixed costs, tangible assets incur high fixed costs, and high costs. In the present conditions, the added value of the manufacturing industry depends mainly on the processing of raw materials into final products. However, in the future, the internet connection will collect customer needs, which manufacturers will only need to update the software for product life without changing any components. Therefore, the value of intangible assets such as technology and data plays an increasingly important role. According to research by Ocean Tomo, intangible assets account for an increasing value in the value chain of a product.

Figure 1: Changes in the ratio of capital in the market value of firms

Second, change in the subjects of ownership

On the Internet of Things platform, millions of devices are collecting data from users around the world every day and sending it to the cloud storage of a certain "boss". These data are valuable data, not just for every company that makes the device but for hundreds of other companies. Every day, such data is still collected, analyzed, and used without the user's knowledge. As can be seen from the digital ethos, the owner no longer limits his ownership as if he possessed tangible matter. The question is: Who owns the data? And with the ability to share data, with no access restrictions, how does the owner of the data benefit from his or her ownership? Answering this question, there are many different opinions: According to Barbara J. Culliton, in universities, or scientific institutions, it is clear that researchers have the right to retain data because

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3 http://www.oceantomo.com/intangible-asset-market-value-study, 2020, interim study update as of 7/1/2020
"Universities rarely claim ownership". In the industrial sector, this ownership is determined by contract, commonly, the data belongs to the company. In governmental organizations and the state, the products that state scientists produce while working for the state belong to the state. But it is difficult to determine that, given the current trend, so many young researchers are working freelance and not really on the state payroll.

According to research by David Loshin, owners of data are very diverse, depending on different situations. For example, data collectors can also become owners of those data. By combining datasets from different sources, one can create a new "body" of information, which is more valuable than the individual pieces of data that make up that "body".

Businesses can also be data owners. For example, collecting data from external market data providers as well as data from internal sales and stock processing in banking. All data is absorbed into a single operating data centre system, then redistributed, often with added value. In this case, the data belongs to the bank.

In other cases, if the user creates authorization requests to create data, pays for the data creation, they take ownership of the data, even if it is created by another party. For example, Mr. A pays Mr. B to report on the competitiveness of the sugar industry in Vietnam, then Mr. A is the only owner of the provided data.

In environments where information is "locked" within specific encrypted formats, the party that can unlock the information becomes the owner of the information. The cost of decoding and implementation is an investment in value derived from information. A particular example of this is shown in the results of DNA sequencing to isolate specific genes. The value of decoding DNA structure can be demonstrated by any improvement in the detection, prevention, or treatment of certain genetic diseases. The bioinformatics companies that decode genetic material are considered owners and can then sell the data they decode to the pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical industries. Even some global data has been shared unlimitedly for everyone to increase global knowledge about a particular issue.

Thanks to the remarkable development of artificial intelligence and intelligent robotics, now computers can organize the available data by themselves, analyze and integrate into a completely new product. For example, a group of members of museums and researchers in the Netherlands published a computer-generated portrait of "The Next Rembrandt" after analyzing thousands of works by Rembrandt - a Dutch painter in the seventeenth century. Moreover, with the development of new technologies such as 3D printing, users can directly participate in the production process by selecting models and customization on each product. So, the final product, which is the result of both

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the producer and the consumer, will be owned by whom, and how are the benefits distributed? This is still a conundrum for administrators.

**Third, forming a new perception trend of ownership.**

From the third industrial revolution to the fourth industrial revolution, there is a generation who tend to consume experience rather than possess material. In 2015, more than 75 million of these young people entered the market, according to the Few Research Centres. These people do not want to own anything, from homes and cars to even a record of music on the shelf. They don’t want the DVD, they want the movie it delivers. They don’t want the CD, they want the music it plays on. They don’t want cars, they want to be met with their travel needs most economically and efficiently. Thus, the future generation of customers will no longer enjoy holding an object and asserting their ownership, they only need the ability to "access" and use it. They feel that owning property is a burden rather than an achievement. Instead of owning to satisfy their own needs, they will find resources in the community.

Along with that trend, the birth of the sharing economy has made the demand for idle asset sharing to be met most effectively. From a macro perspective, a sharing economy is where available resources are exploited collectively among users through technology. People, instead of possessing to satisfy their needs, will find resources in the community. The sharing economy is growing because it redistributes resources that are not being used effectively (products that are bought but not used, machines are underutilized) to where it is used more efficiently. Then, consumers realize: Sharing and redistributing resources started to get cheaper compared to buying new and throwing away old stuff. Since then, there appeared the reversing trend of consumerism, turning to sharingism. As the Internet spreads more effectively to connect those who have and need it, people are not only buyers but can also sell through peer-to-peer commerce. This enables the wasted things that are not used to be utilized through the technology platform. Through these platforms, people begin to change relationships with things they own, they realize what can be accessed without having to own, which is expensive to maintain, which is not necessary, something that is not used often should be rented, not be purchased.

2.3. Sharing economy in Vietnam and issues about ownership relations in the sharing economy

**Types of sharing economy in Vietnam**

Vietnam is one of the first countries in ASEAN to allow a pilot business model of transport-related technology translation (e.g. Uber, Grab) starting in 2014. However, after 4 years of operation, by April 2018, Uber withdrew from the Southeast Asian market and exchanged a 27.5% stake in Grab. Immediately, after Uber withdrew from the market, Vietnam witnessed a strong development, showing the economic model of

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sharing as a potential market segment. In May 2018, the VATO application appeared on the market and many other technology taxi companies such as Gonow of Viettel or the newly invented application of FPT’s T.Net. Besides, it also creates a strong incentive for traditional businesses to change their operating methods from manual to technology application.

Airbnb is a model that connects people who need to rent a house to families with available rooms to rent via a mobile application similar to Uber, Grab. This is a relatively new type of service, operating on a decentralized platform model, all payments are made using credit cards and via Airbnb. This intermediary will charge a fee for both the reservationist and the host. The fee for the host is 3% of the total value of the reservation, the fee for the guest book is 6 - 12% and this fee will always be displayed during the customer using the service. This fee still ensures that people pay less than hotel reservations via traditional channels.

Many services provide a widely applied platform, namely Triip.me using a business model like Airbnb, which uses community resources to design tours worldwide; changing the style of travel guides, analytics help tourists learn more about where and whom they want to go and help them connect with locals around the world, or food service, labour, consumer goods.

Financial services applying technology (peer-to-peer lending) typically provide a platform to connect between lenders and borrowers such as lendbiz.vn, tima.vn...; Receiving the trend of service provision in the market, on June 5, 2018, Fin Financial Technology Innovation Joint Stock Company officially launched peer-to-peer lending services in Hanoi. This is an innovative start-up in the P2P Lending sector using an advanced technology platform in Vietnam.

The daily development of technology has led to the innovation in scaling up services such as Grab, transportation service is no longer just between people but expanding into freight services. Food transportation meets the practical needs of society. So does the connection of users with other Rada service providers with specific areas of home appliance repair, water and utility construction, airports, long-distance transportation, automotive equipment repair. After one year from April 2016 to April 2017, more than 20,000 successful transactions with 56,000 customers, more than 1,000 suppliers, and 3,500 workers/supplier, Rada started collecting money from the successful transactions (pcworld, 2017); or Okiaf's hourly maid, house cleaning application.

Vietnam’s policy response to the shared economic model is reflected in Decision No. 999/ QD-TTg approving the Project to promote the shared economic model dated August 12, 2019, by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc. The goal is to ensure a fair business environment between businesses following traditional economic and sharing

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economic models. This move shows a change in the Government's awareness and action in recognizing a new business form based on the optimization of redundant resources in society as well as economic activities based on the advances of science and technology, especially the development of the 4th industrial revolution.

Decision No. 999 / QD-TTg dated August 12, 2019, of the Prime Minister, has created a legal foundation with the support of the State to help technology companies operate in a sharing economic model, create an equal competition space between traditional companies and technology companies. The most important thing in the development of these models is the ultimate benefit to the user. The project of promoting the sharing economic model aims to ensure an equal business environment between business enterprises according to the traditional economic and sharing economic model; ensure the legitimate rights, responsibilities, and interests of the parties to the sharing economic model, including service providers, service users and platform providers; to encourage innovation, digital technology application and digital economy development. The project’s point of view is to support and adapt to the new development trend of the sharing economy model in the very rapid development of digital technology in the world; It is not necessary to have separate policies for the business model according to the shared economic model because the sharing economy is not a separate economic component in the economy.

**Issues on ownership relations in the sharing economy in Vietnam**

*First, the changes in the objects of ownership in sharing economies require a more complete regulatory institutional foundation.*

Although in the sharing economy, it is indispensable for material and non-material, tangible and intangible objects such as capital, labour, resources ... like any economy, the most important object of ownership is the technology platform. Obviously, tech companies may not have any physical assets related to their businesses. For example, Grab does not own a car, Airbnb does not own a house at all. They only possess the technological foundation and the way for the owners of "material" resources to come together to meet needs. Thus, in the sharing economy, the issue of owning assets, capital ... is only relative in generating revenue and profits for businesses. Ownership is ultimately a means, not an objective when entering the market. The most important factor is the technology and consumer data systems.

The use of technology has helped the sharing economy model operate with high efficiency, save costs, and increase benefits for suppliers, needers, and middlemen. At the same time, saving capital of the company by not building facilities, buying input materials but using community capital (cars of participants, houses of participants) assists the companies in gaining a big profit and expanding its influence around the world quickly - no need to go through foreign joint ventures or open representative offices overseas. Other assets including goods, services, space, skills, and money can all be shared. The sharing economy creates a kind of real social capital but relies on a reciprocal exchange between people (either in a positive or negative direction). Ownership is the social relationship that arises between people in the "possession" of material, and here is the relationship between people in the process of "sharing"
resources. Therefore, the emerging "new" assets will need to be managed not in the traditional way but require new policy directions and legal corridors.

Initial review and assessment of the response of current laws to the sharing economic model show that the current legal system of investment and business in Vietnam (Law on Investment, Law on Enterprises, The Law on E-commerce, tax laws, etc.) have no regulations related to the operation of the sharing economy model. For example, the business model, the product, or the service is not in the category of business, so the business has difficulty registering to establish a business; therefore, most new business models are subscribed to another Service industry. Some shortcomings in the current legal system governing the operation of the sharing economy model in Vietnam include:

(1) There is a lack of policies to ensure fair competition between the traditional economy and the sharing economy in each specific industry. The recent proliferation of services under the sharing economy model in Vietnam has raised concerns about unequal competition (due to lack of legal corridors) if executive management did not have a timely and proper intervention. Because of the superiority of this new economic model, it will create great competitive pressure on traditional business enterprises. Conflicts of interest between enterprises doing business under the sharing economy model and enterprises traditionally doing business will occur. Most of this conflict is very fierce without good policies of the government to act as "the arbitrator" to resolve. When there are no uniform policies, the problem of unfair competition with traditional enterprises is a big risk that needs to be solved. The story of the lawsuit between Vinasun - a traditional taxi business with Grab in the past time is one of the typical examples.

(2) Lack of regulations on product or service quality control to protect consumers, especially defining more clearly the obligation to protect consumers' interests in e-commerce activities related to the sharing economy. The sharing economy has potential risks that managers need to pay attention to ensure the interests of both buyers (consumers) and sellers (service providers). Although the parties have more complete information about each other, the verification of information and direct contact with each other is less, so there is also a greater risk if not overcome by specific regulations and efficiency. The issue of insurance and safety for parties including service providers and service users/customers or customers is also more severe.

(3) There is a lack of mechanisms and policies to define clearer responsibilities of the sharing economy parties. Due to the appearance of a third party as a technology platform, the contractual relationship in the sharing economy will be at least a 3-party relationship instead of a 2-party relationship as in previous contracts. The legal framework specifying the responsibilities of each party to this contractual relationship should be changed and supplemented. This is also one of the reasons that countries in the world (even developed countries) need to adjust their legal systems to behave appropriately in the new context of the sharing economy.

Second, the issue of property rights, especially intellectual property

In the sharing economy, there is not only the sharing of services and goods but also the sharing of information. Exchange of information can create cooperation or deals of great
value. Under such circumstances, concerns about intellectual property rights were raised again. For example, sharing in the software and innovation industries leads to the further development of new licenses specifying the data sharing and collaborating terms, use and reuse for either personal or commercial purposes or other matters. The more sharing, the more prevalent the use of standardized licenses becomes. In a world where businesses and houses are (ideally) owned by members of the local community, there is good compliance with property laws will keep lawyers busy in sharing economies. That implies that the clear delineation of ownership in the sharing economy is very time-consuming and laborious.

Not until the fourth industrial period, intellectual property was concerned by countries, but it was the fourth industrial revolution that made intellectual property increasingly compulsory in the process of international integration, economic growth, and development of each country, including Vietnam. The products of knowledge, the products of creativity need to be protected by the law to bring about justice, and to further stimulate the development of science and technology. The industrial 4.0 digital storm has posed a great challenge to the law on intellectual property, requiring the provisions of the law on intellectual property to be more innovative, creative, and stricter.

The 3D printing technology - a remarkable achievement of the 4th industrial revolution, can have profound effects on intellectual property rights regulations because 3D printing is identified as conflicting with property Intellectual property or not is a very difficult job for both users and authorities. This technology allows the reproduction of objects or the materialization of designs. With just a 3D printer, anyone can download a computer-aided design (CAD) file, which "guides" the printer to create 3D objects.

Due to their digital existence, these CAD files are easily shared on the Internet through file-sharing services, similar to what computer users do with movies or songs. Thus, as long as there are a CAD file and a 3D printer, one can manufacture the product in a factory without any legal obligations related to intellectual property protection. Therefore, 3D printing technology is forecasted to create a series of infringements of protected patents. Besides, patents often protect a method of manufacturing a new product, while a 3D printer can create that product without violating the protected manufacturing method. Even when a patent protects a new product, 3D printing makes it easier for people to modify and design new products based on protected products.

The next obstacle is to prove a violation of intellectual property laws when 3D printing can take place anywhere, anytime, as long as there is a printer, even before the official manufacturer. The commercialization of 3D printers poses a huge challenge for market managers when the amount of counterfeit products is extremely large. Businesses can face serious trouble when other vendors or even individuals can easily copy their products using design files or 3D scanners. CAD files of objects, assumed to have intellectual property protection, can also be instantly shared with the world thanks to online 3D printing devices. Conflict of intellectual property rights at the corporate level, even up to the national level, is entirely at risk.
Thus, the sharing economy on applying the achievements of the fourth industrial revolution poses many challenges in the protection of intellectual property. The future of intellectual property will be affected in the way that many types of intellectual property will merge into one. For example, the copyright will be imported into patent rights. Also, when protecting intellectual property, instead of focusing on the protection of the production method, the composition of the product, people will focus on protecting ideas, designs - proof for the benefits of creators and probably will be the main source of profit in the coming time.

While the modern market economies in the world have been taking ownership of intangible assets very seriously, in Vietnam, there is still a heavy burden of owning tangible assets (owning in-kind). It is probably due to the slower development of the market economy in Vietnam that many forms of value ownership such as information ownership, management know-how, trademarks, copyrights, valuable papers are still not popular. The more scientific and technological revolution develops, the more important intellectual property is, which will have a strong impact on developing countries like Vietnam, open up opportunities and challenges for businesses, technology transfer policy-making, and regulatory agencies. The objective of economic activities in the market mechanism is value and profit. The fourth industrial revolution made owning tangible assets gradually no longer the goal, but only a means. In order to achieve value and profit goals, owners do not necessarily only own means of production.

On the contrary, owning value that is not based on in-kind ownership can still benefit such as buying brands, selling ideas...

Third, there is a lack of means and ways to evaluate and measure the efficiency and profitability of enterprises pursuing the form of “sharing economy”. Lots of activities like renting out your second home for a few days on the Airbnb app platform don’t count towards your gross GDP, and neither do other activities. Some argue that this can be taken lightly because it is clear that we are using resources more efficiently, we are creating more value than producing more and more goods that can contribute to GDP data but not be necessary for this planet. This statement is not wrong in the downward trend of “consumerism”. But the problem here goes further than that. Macro accounting is essential in any economy. The economy needs macro-balances, but we are lacking the data means to demonstrate that the “sharing economy” can create more equilibrium in society. The control of information transparency of these enterprises as well as the management of electronic transactions, international payment on card trade is a problem that is difficult for managers. The tax administration for the sharing economy model is also facing many difficulties, almost impossible to solve. It is difficult for managers to grasp the exact number of transactions carried out in the form of a sharing economy and who participate in this model.

Fourth, the responsibilities of parties participating in the sharing economy. Not owning material production but mainly sharing resources, corporate responsibility is reduced to a minimum, especially the responsibility to the workforce of the enterprise. Employees’ lack of benefits in terms of health insurance, job security, and peer-to-peer transactions will increase inequality. It breaks down the workload, and also
disrupts the perks of the association, from health care to insurance, from training to skills and promotion incentives. This is the biggest social failure of this economic model when it does not shape a workforce for itself. For example: When Uber was acquired by Grab, thousands of Uber driver service workers were not officially notified and struggled to find new jobs or new ways to join Grab’s workforce. The question is, what happens when thousands of workers are uninsured, have no job skills, and have no social welfare?

The relationships between those with wealth and intermediaries are also worth discussing. In the new model of sharing economy, fintech is still service intermediaries, but the problem with Uber or Grab is that the significant business risk is passed on to workers providing direct services, which they call partners, rather than deeper intervention. In the financial sector, intermediaries are also forced to be under the strict control of regulators, making it difficult to pass all risks to users.

In addition, the fact that goods and services are exchanged in a "shared" way with an infinite number of interactions will lead to challenges for policy managers such as the requirement for a favourable business environment, ensuring the benefits harmonization with traditional service business models; controlling the transparency of information; management of electronic transactions, international payment for commerce by card; product and service quality management; tax loss prevention (corporate income tax and personal income tax) and some other social problems arise such as labour, employment, and social security... The sharing economy is not an economy where prosperity and power are shared between rich and poor. On the contrary, it seems that this pattern worsens income inequality and concentrates wealth in the hands of the richest who do not need it most.

Of course, there are still many problems related to the sharing economy, but within the scope of this study, it only mentions some changes in ownership relations in the context of economic operation. And that is also the basis for the authors to propose many solutions to the above problems.

2.4. Several solutions to problems arising in ownership relations when developing the sharing economy in Vietnam

To build a foundation to ensure the expansion and development of the sharing economy as well as to solve problems arising in ownership relations, some solutions are proposed as follows:

First, completing institutions, providing a full and flexible legal environment, creating conditions for the effective development and management of parties participating in the sharing economic model, in line with a rapid change of science and technology. In terms of technology, the Government must establish a transparent database in many areas related to population, employment, industry, and services to respond promptly to changes in economic structure, problems of the labour movement, and unemployment. In the legal aspect, the Government must develop and amend legal documents in many areas that tend to use strong digital technologies such as transport, health, environment, tourism, and e-commerce.
Up to now, the Government of Vietnam has not had a legal corridor to ensure businesses operating under a sharing economy model. The activities of the world’s leading enterprises in this model such as Uber and Grab in Vietnam are only at a pilot level, even banned in some places. Before the issuance of Decree 10/2020 / ND-CP, the Ministry of Transport issued a document to suspend a new pilot with technology transport enterprises, the cause is the boom of technology taxis putting pressure on infrastructure, inequality with other types of transport services. Building a legal corridor for this economic model is essential to ensure social order and security, harmonize the interests of all parties, and ensure consumers’ interests. If managers recognize that the problem is urgent, having a far-reaching impact on the society, requiring tight management, they must urgently revise laws and decrees to adjust. The mindset "Banning the unmanageable" is not unacceptable. Because, as the trend will happen sooner or later, the domestic authorities need to identify the issue accurately so that from there to soon build a legal corridor for businesses to feel secure to operate and create value, profit. Recently, Airbnb, a leading enterprise in room sharing, has entered the Indonesian market but has not yet entered Vietnam, although there have been many moves before. This choice may have many reasons, but perhaps partly, they are also waiting for the official response of Vietnam to the Grab test.

Second, to renew the intellectual property regime in the direction of encouraging creativity and protecting property rights in all fields. Enhance, promote, and encourage creative activities in Vietnam in all fields to create a new intellectual capacity, patents, inventions, brands... Besides, it must perfect the institutional system including laws related to intellectual property, which expands the protected objects in the fields of technology, based on the internet of things, big data, and computing cloud - the technological platforms of the sharing economy. Specifying mechanisms for establishing rights, exploiting values, and protecting intellectual property rights against all infringements. Besides, building regulations on mechanisms for customer information assurance, data security, transactions, and handling measures when businesses violate.

Third, to quickly build a system of means and ways to make economic accounting and information transparency in the sharing economy. Product quality management is provided by “semi-specialized” business entities, transactions in the form of electronic payments, tax management from businesses according to the sharing economic model, ensuring no loss of national resources. The participant management mechanism is often difficult to apply to direct service providers, because of the diversity and complexity, often without specific clues. The regulator should focus on the entity providing the intermediary service between the supplier and the user on a technology platform - because managing data from the software is often more accurate and efficient. Depending on each type of sharing economy business model and types of goods and services, regulations should be set correspondingly.

Fourth, to increase the understanding of parties when participating in the sharing model, to have a management mechanism to protect legal rights and interests as well as personal property. Participants can claim benefits when participating in transactions through different types of insurance (labour insurance, rental insurance, car rental ...).
There should be a mechanism to clarify roles and responsibilities and have regulations to punish violations, prevent abuse, and ensure data security when participating in the sharing economy model.

It is undeniable that, in addition to the advantages, the sharing model also reveals some limitations on the issue of ownership relations, ensuring the harmony of interests of the parties, the lack of insurance sanctions, tax evasion, business ethics, and quality management sharing services. However, this model will certainly have a strong impact on the future of the economy and overcoming the limitation can only be done by a strict legal corridor.

Conclusion

In today’s digital age, the sharing economy has become a growing trend for many economies around the world. This research paper provides an overview of the sharing economy and the possibilities of developing the sharing economy in Vietnam. The essence of the sharing economy model is to take advantage of the development of digital technology to save transaction costs and reach many customers through digital platforms, which is to use public applications and digital technology to provide information to individuals and organizations, thereby allowing to optimize resources through the redistribution, sharing and reuse of redundant capabilities of goods and services. The article has affirmed that Vietnam is not out of the general trend. In Vietnam, there is also the activity of sharing economy. Since then, it has led to a certain change in the ownership relationship, such as about the owner, about the object of ownership, and formed a new perception of ownership ... These changes have raised many problems that need to be addressing the development of the sharing economy in Vietnam, that is: changes in ownership objects in sharing economies require a more complete institutional and management foundation; property rights, especially intellectual property; means and ways to evaluate and measure the efficiency and profitability of enterprises pursuing the form of “sharing economy”.

The article also gives some discussions on institutional improvement, providing a full and flexible legal environment, creating conditions for the effective development and management of actors participating in the sharing economic model, consistent with the rapid change of science and technology background; to renew the intellectual property regime in the direction of encouraging creativity and protecting property rights in various fields; to quickly build a system of means and methods for economic accounting and information transparency in the sharing economy; enhancing understanding of subjects when participating in the sharing model, having a management mechanism to protect legal rights and interests as well as personal property. are meaningful solutions in perfecting ownership relations when developing the sharing economy in Vietnam. We believe that Vietnam’s sharing economy will develop rapidly, making a worthy contribution to the country’s socio-economic development in today’s digital age.
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There is a good number of books dwelling on the impact of AI. Not many books are written on the concept of power. Rajiv Malhotra has eloquently written his insights into how AI would change the social fabric which in turn revolutionizes the understanding of the term power. At the onset, this book is meant for general reading and not specifically designed for the social science experts of technology scientists. Accordingly, this work should not be compared with the works of Nick Bostrom, Andrew NG, or Kai-Fu Lee. This book is structured on the five battlegrounds which are not to be confused with the geopolitical tussles. They represent the Economy and Jobs; Psychology; Global Power, Metaphysics, and India’s future. This book appears to have emerged from the authors own philosophical debate between constructivism and material determinism. The author does not explicitly bring the western Science, Technology, and Society (STS) scholarship but builds his constructivism on Indian traditional knowledge systems. Books like Mahabharata, Gita and scholars like Sant Ramdas, Tukaram were frequently quoted. He espouses that the development and deployment of AI must be in congruence with the Indian traditional knowledge. This reminds the new book of Indian External Affairs Minister, Subramanian Jaishankar, in his book also has a similar take when it comes to the designing of foreign policy (Jaishankar, 2020, p. 112).

While this is the base on which the author builds his entire work, the readability of the book is quite efficient. The introduction provides a summary of all the chapters providing a reader with a good glimpse of the book. Each chapter has highlights mentioned at the start telling the reader what she could expect from the chapter. This layout of the book makes the reading comfortable. This review follows a theme wise analysis of the author’s arguments.

**Overview of AI technologies**

In defining machine learning and big data, the author has taken a more practical approach to explain. A non-technical reader will find it easy. While getting onto a philosophical discussion on consciousness vs intelligence, he explains pretty well why AI systems can have human intelligence but not consciousness. While ascribing the status of an intelligent being to an AI system, it is convincingly put that it does not have a self-hood (Malhotra, 2021, p. 26). After the discussion on how AI does not have consciousness, it would have been better if the legal personhood status is also discussed. Such discussion would bring out the probable changes going to occur in the judicial power. The author’s claim to AI not having consciousness contradicts Harari’s claim that human beings are algorithms (Harari N. Y., 2017, p. 97). Both are correct in their paradigms.
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**Agency is being shared with AI Systems.**

The author considers that AI developers take a reductionist approach in understanding human consciousness (Malhotra, 2021, p. 219). Accordingly, such a reductionist approach would make the society materialistic and brushes away the spiritual paradigm. I would call this objectification of society over subjectification. A socially constructed world is subjective but ubiquitous AI would make it more objective. With the advent of AI, material determinism might take over the conscious decision making of humans, thus giving up the agency. Calling it cobots, the author opines that the transfer of agency from a human to a robot would be done gradually culminating in the complete transfer. This is similar to the explanation of Latour in his examples of Seat Belt and Door Keeper (Latour, 1992). Such agency transfer, according to the author is done in an accelerating manner. Such fast-paced AI disruption will advise scholars to think beyond the Luddite fallacy and prepare for the anthropomorphic future.

The author is convinced that the next decade is ushered by the electronic fueled by AI systems (Malhotra, 2021, p. 23). However, Future of Life Institute, a non—profit organization working on the societal impacts of technology opines that there is no consensus on when AI would become ubiquitous or achieve the level of general intelligence (Future of Life Institute, n.d.). Even Nick Bostrom, author of the famous book, Superintelligence opines that AI can achieve human-level machine intelligence by mid-century but not any sooner (Bostrom, 2017, p. 25). Going by these opinions, Rajiv Malhotra’s opinion of the next decade being ushered by AI systems must be carefully read. It does not mean achieving any general intelligence or superintelligence, but a peripheral level adaptation of AI in every aspect of life.

**Data Rights**

“Anonymization is an exercise in futility” (Malhotra, 2021, p. 60)

Current debates on data protection are opined to be a futile attempt to protect personal data. Digital firms engaging in anonymizing personal data suffices the concept of privacy protection on an individual according to the current laws. Author argument on this aspect quite convincingly. Data can be numbered instead of mapping them to some names, the data. Data sets such as obtained can be used for any purpose and successfully exploits the behaviour data points of an individual. They can at least identify the behavioural attributes of a region, society, and any small groups. While the book does not mention that a family can also be considered as a group, numeral coding of the personal data can be grouped as families while still protecting the identity from the auditors. I concur with the author on making the data an intellectual property of an individual. Such protected data would require the permission of the user every time a firm uses it.

Expanding the discussion on data rights to the global level, the author brings in the concept of data capitalism. It is a phenomenon in which private firms try to control the world market by collecting the data. As the platform companies have grown exponentially in value and influence, it has become difficult for the new players to
emerge in their field of business. Factors such as capital, first-mover advantage in the data acquisition, possessing already trained models, user investment in the platforms, acquisitions, vertical integration make the new entries difficult (Malhotra, 2021, p. 76). New players neither will have enough data to understand the market nor the capital to invest in cutting edge technologies.

**AI generates new have-nots**

An extension to the impact of AI on socio-economic conditions is the division of the entire population into have-nots. The author backs this argument by quoting various reports and scholarly works. However, I disagree when the author says that AI automation of industry would throw many off their jobs. Such condition is opined to reduce the spending capacity of the market-leading to demand constrained conditions (Malhotra, 2021, p. 95). He also mentions other factors like the growth of the elderly population, disengagement of women in some service sectors, large swatches of obsolete workers (not equipped to work alongside AI). This, I considered being a biased analysis. If AI becomes ubiquitous in the industry, the types of jobs which would emerge would be human interactors, hangouters, explorer companions, etc. Today, these are not considered jobs. The author recognizes such jobs in the future but says they do not add up to the jobs lost (Malhotra, 2021, p. 100).

**Global Power Change**

“Modern civilization will hopefully survive and become stronger, but it will certainly become radically transformed in the process.” (Malhotra, 2021, p. 102)

When Harari said that "humankind has lost its faith in the liberal story that dominate the world politics in recent decades" because of the merger of biotechnology and information technology (Harari Y. N., 2019, p. 9), I thought the rise of AI would take away the agency from humans. Such development would put a curtain on the traditional geopolitics as the war and frictions of the nation-states (of course in a century). Rajiv Malhotra reiterated the same concern but in a different manner. The loss of faith in liberalism appears to be covered by China’s totalitarian system. Its export of sovereign cyberspace can be thought of as an initial warning.

“Artificial Intelligence is to China’s twenty-first century rise to the power what the industrial revolution was to Britain’s ascendance on the late 1700s.” (Malhotra, 2021, p. 107)

China historically has been a regional hegemon. After the opium wars, it has lost its dominance and got subdued by the colonial powers. Maybe with this hindsight, the author claims that China has learnt to build its empire to dominate the world and not the region to not repeat its mistakes.

India and its laidback attitude

“If data represents national wealth, India is for sale.” (Malhotra, 2021, p. 119)

“The decision by Utter Pradesh Chief Minister, Yogi Adityanath, to invite foreign organizations to capture big data on the Kumbh Mela has been one of the biggest blunders and sellout of India’s data assets.” (Malhotra, 2021, p. 302)
Despite India’s effort in preparing a data protection bill, it has not been able to pass legislation. Recently on February 25, the Ministry of Information Technology has passed a gazette notification titled “released Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code.” It must be appreciated as it mandates private companies to put up grievance mechanisms, and content regulations. But it is not bothered about the data outflows. As the author puts it in the phrase above, India is indeed put for sale. India is always meddled up with ad hoc legislations, silly political debates between the parties, communal narratives. China, on the other hand, has meticulously supervised its strategy of becoming a great power. It started with the consolidation of political power, educating its citizens, getting the most advanced skill into the country by all means, and structurally combining these developments with the correct anticipatory policies regarding technological development (Malhotra, 2021, p. 122). The author quite efficiently and eloquently argues that China is rising above the US in AI development and research.

It is opined that India lags decades behind other nations like the US and China. NITI Aayog’s 2018 discussion paper is considered to have a rudimentary and elementary level of analysis of AI impact on society (Malhotra, 2021, p. 267). I agree with this argument that NITI Aayog’s 115-page document provides nothing but a list of wishes (Polcumpally, 2020). The author gives a detailed explanation of why India is vulnerable with its overpopulated, under-educated and low R&D in the field of AI. Further, it is opined that India is over-dependent on foreign technologies (Malhotra, 2021, p. 276). The author opines that India has sidelined its traditional knowledge and quickly adopted western modernization systems. Instead of accepting foreign knowledge, it is opined to integrated western modernization with Indian traditions. But, the author misses the point that traditions are constructed on the bygone knowledge systems.

The author’s criticism of educational institutions using foreign platforms and giving up the data is unwarranted. They use foreign platforms and software because; firstly there are no indigenously developed softwares which are as efficient as the foreign ones. Secondly, there are no regulations on the operations of foreign softwares and intellectual property rights on the indigenous data. Further, his detailed listing of why Facebook is happy to get access to India’s market provides a warning on how foreign companies could psychologically colonize India (Malhotra, 2021, p. 312) (Malhotra, 2021, p. 318). An interesting comparison has been made to the pre-colonial era. Those were the times when regional powers used the forces of the French, British, and Dutch to tackle other regional powers (Malhotra, 2021, p. 320). Today, it is the same, but not with military assistance but with capital investments and technology.

“US congressmen have held hearings in which they have accused Google of stealing the data of Americans...Australian and EU governments are cracking down against the US tech giants. But Indians feel proud ... and unconcerned about the subordinate place it is being assigned.” (Malhotra, 2021, p. 322)

Having established that India is held back a decade in the advancement of AI, its education is opined to cater to provide modern slaves for the foreign companies. The author severely and correctly points out the Indian establishment’s attitude to selling their labour at whatever price to tackle its increasing unemployment (Malhotra, 2021,
AI implication on social sciences
An interesting application of AI mentioned in the book is social sciences (Malhotra, 2021, p. 39). While I read a lot on the impact of AI, I seldom come across literature asking social sciences to adopt AI systems. I strongly agree with this opinion and believe that all social sciences should dwell more on philosophical discussions rather than just the collection of data and putting them into theoretical models. The entire discipline of social science will undergo a revolution in its practices. With the approaches like humanism being discarded, social science methods like social constructivism, disciplines like anthropology, sociology, and political science will become obsolete in their present form.

The author opines that instead of the western sociology paradigm, Indian social science researchers could adopt the Vedic concept of Purushartha. It provides for four pursuits of life viz. Artha, Kama, Dharma, Moksha. All this education system, youth’s thought processes are all based on the borrowed western knowledge is a path towards an aesthetic life. Even in ancient India, the common man would not have learnt all this. Severe criticism of western sociology and its scientific methods is a bit extreme. Even with western knowledge or even epistemology, Indian societies can be shaped in accordance with the modern era.

Conclusion
This book provides a way to exclude all the material available on the open internet. It provides sufficient information on the impact of AI on society, state and global politics. Though it does not cover AI breakthroughs, it is a good amalgamation of concerns regarding AI.

Concepts like data capitalism, dumbing down of the Indian society, humans losing agency, China and US tussle, global economic inequality, objectification of the society, changes in the discipline of social sciences and Indian government’s unwanted attitude regarding the data and technology policy are some of the major aspects to look forward in this book.

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Book Review-II


Dr Adil Rasheed is a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) and is also the coordinator of the Centre for Countering -Terrorism at the Institute. He is one of India’s noted scholars in the field of counter-radicalisation. His research papers namely ‘ Jihadist Radicalisation in India: Internal Challenges, External Threats and ‘Countering the threat of radicalisation: Theories, Programmes and Challenges’ are being widely read and referred to in the Indian strategic community. He writes extensively for Indian and international media organisations and is a scholar of Islamic theology and history.

Countering the Radical Narrative is both timely, topical and invaluable book based on comprehensive research on the conceptual underpinnings of narratives, countering the radical narratives and indoctrination with respect to the extremists, terrorists groups and organisations. Radicalisation has emerged as a significant challenge across the South Asian region over the past decade and it cannot be countered by kinetic measures alone, therefore the book is an apt reading and response mechanism in proposing not only deep insights but also proposing ways, methods and techniques for reversing or rather countering radicalisation with a particular focus on the threats posed by the global jihadists groups.

Though the definition is given by the author, ‘The indoctrination of extremists ideologies lead to the transformation of law-abiding citizens into violent extremists’ is perhaps too simplistic a definition for such a complex and complicated phenomenon called radicalisation. In today’s context, one can rightly argue that radicalisation is targeting our future generation i.e. the youth. The very notion that only madrasa educated youth are vulnerable to becoming radicalised and terrorist might not give a complete picture, therefore there is a need to revisit radicalisation with a new prism especially with concerning youth. The book examines the need to fight this by understanding the ideological and psychological domain of the terrorists.

Chapter two enumerates the various psychological operations and messaging which are conducted by many means of dissemination like face-to-face communication, print media (pamphlets, books, magazines, etc), audiovisual means (television), Audio media (radio or loudspeaker), visual media or the digital domain. Such operations have been divided into three categories as tactical, strategic and consolidation activities.

The methodology followed in the book is primarily analysing the techniques and literature from secondary sources like books, and religious literature like Quran. Detailed research has also been done on the very concept of Jihad and how it has been

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1 Rasheed, Adil., Chapter 1, Introduction: The War of Narratives, New Delhi/Knowledge world/ 2020, p.3.

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misinterpreted by the militant and deviant Islamic ideologies which not only alter the Sunni jurisprudential position of Pristine Jihad, which are not from the “Ulema” i.e. the religious scholars of orthodox Islam, but from radical modern Mujahideen that seeks to rewrite a new Jihad that legitimises their asymmetric form of warfare (which includes terrorism and ethnic cleansing) to defeat the imperial west.2

The author has highlighted the ways and methods of counter-radicalisation which includes counter-narrative campaigns against Jihadist organisations, clearly laying down how there has been a doctrinal shift in the very concept and understanding of the term ‘Jihad’. Today deconstruction of such radical narrative is the need of the hour. Counter-narratives are written and explained eloquently in the book, but the fact remains that mostly the western authors have written on the subject. It is time that more South Asian scholars should research the theoretical underpinnings of this concept as it is organic to the region.

Chapter three very eloquently describes the meaning of the term “Narrative” as the construct of consciousness. The highly developed social and political narratives can provide an organisational framework for action and binding together people into a social-cultural and political fraternity, having a common tradition, values and a distinct sense of identity. A corpus of common literature, language, traditions, beliefs and values helps forge groups, organisations, religious communities, political groups and movements as well as nations. By organising and synthesising multiple and scattered events in time and space, human beings came to know, understand and make sense of the world around them and forge their social identities. Thus, narratives have rightly been called the the “equipment’s of living”.3 They help build collective identities and develop for their intended communities a common social, cultural, racial, ethnic, religious, national or linguistic heritage.

The meta-narratives which lie behind a narrative present themselves as theories like Marxism, Fascism and even modern Islamism. The author rightly mentions that by using propaganda tools, idea framing, narrative persuasion takes place. The Pakistan Inter-Service Public Relations is excelling in its fake news and propaganda exercises, they have separate departments of academic writers, authors, professional storytellers who showcase the Pakistan Army as the sole protector and caretaker of the nation’s national interest and ideology, and also run successfully an anti - India campaign.

Chapter four rightly alludes to the many distortions in the methodology of jihad which are unique to groups like ISIS when they violate canonical law in the name “ijtihaad” (independent Legal Reasoning). Therefore there is doctrinal deviance in the very concept of Jihad today. Three kinds of Jihadi narratives specific to India namely the Salafi-Jihadist terror group, Pak -based anti-India Groups and the homegrown jihadists groups. The author rightly portrays that the creation of a counter-narrative is not only infused by its content, but by the form and style of its medium of dissemination and target audience. Therefore, counter-narratives should be developed and disseminated as a coherent strategic communication policy and programme in sync with national and constitutional value and sensibilities. This is of utmost necessity and importance.

2 Ibid, p.132.
3 Ibid, p.28.
Chapter five is my favourite read. It deals with the art of developing counter-narrative in a very interesting and insightful manner, by dwelling on the types of counter-narratives as political, religious, ethical, social and historical. But when the author writes about the need for the development of a grand narrative which could provide a principled ideological consistency in the counter-narrative campaign – that seems to be a real challenge. As on one hand, the author has listed nine types of counter-narratives there may be many more yet to be deciphered and to encompass all of these into a grand strategy, is it doable? especially when the target audience of the counter-narrative is also multidimensional and multifaceted.

For countering the narrative, we know that only a better idea can erase a former idea, meaning for an online and offline narrative of the radicalised organisations, we need a better and stronger set of counter-narratives, for this, it is important to have a good, solid-based partnership between Government and civil society to help counter such radical narratives. Cyber radicalisation and technologically savvy users are only growing in numbers, and this is an ever-increasing challenge.

The book discusses concepts which are devised by the so-called jihadist ideologues—“Offensive Jihad against Jahiliyya” by Sayed Qutb, Mohammed Frarg’s concept of militant jihad as “fard al ayn”, Taquiddin Nabhani’s Dystopian vision of “global Caliphate”, Abdullah Azzam’s ‘transnational jihad’ so on and so forth. But what remains revealing is the other distorted religious concepts such as Jihad, Darulislam, ummah, takfir, al walawalbara, along with the so-called master narrative of the so-called global jihadists such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The study in the book is also based on the two IDSA surveys conducted one in Hyderabad and the other in New- Delhi to understand the current ideological orientation of Muslim society. The results of the survey were interesting and revealed that the Indian Muslim community remains loyal to the nation but feels disenchanted from most state institutions except judiciary and believes that the dangers of radicalisation are more prevalent in the majority community. Radical views were found to be more prevalent among the elderly and educated Muslims, professors, journalists etc., while the younger generation particularly the student community’s responses were found to be remarkably moderate. I wonder why some other states with a large number of the Muslim population were left out, as these too could have provided valuable insights and more data?

Chapters six and seven are unique in providing religious counter-narratives themes from the Islamic scriptures (Quran and Hadeth). These scriptures on which the majority of Muslims scholars have consensus proves that Islam respects the plurality of religions and calls on the Muslims to be kind and just to the non-muslims. Jihad means to ‘strive for’ and not ‘war’ Islam considers war as an evil, and makes it mandatory to accept peace in the first instance. The author goes on to write that the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” is distorted, exaggerated and misunderstood.

The agents of disseminating counter-narratives should include the govt and the non-governmental organisations, the innumerable social media outlets and the civil society as well. The book has collected data on the several Muslim scholars who have produced themes for counter-narratives against the ideology of so-called Jihadi and Pak based
terrorism. It is an important contribution to the conceptual understanding and analysis of radicalisation, its techniques, radical indoctrination of the contemporary jihadist groups, including the ways and means to counter them.

The ten policy recommendations are given in the concluding chapters especially the creation of a central hub for monitoring radical narratives for developing counter-narratives and disseminating them; creation of an institution of assembly of experts; a library/database of counter-narrative related text; non-punitive moral code of conduct for various media houses; and hiring of public relations and advertising companies all seem to be workable measures for countering and keeping radicalisation in check. The findings of this book are of immense value, and it is a must-read for the counter-terrorism experts, strategic community, military and security agencies operating in terrorist infested areas, as well as media organisations and policymakers.
Book Review-III


Introduction

Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, in her new book, The Art of Law in the International Community, packs the tale of an extra-positive approach to law-making back at the centre of the stage. The book attempts to consider the role of the community to explain the rise of two pillars of contemporary international law, namely the legal regulation of the use of force and the rules (or more precisely the meta-rules) on jus cogens. The book shifts steadily towards the intersection between natural law, jus cogens, and the ban of unilateral use of force. Methodologically speaking, the two regimes intersect since both are off-springs of the UN Charter and the 1969 Vienna Convention. Perhaps not in the same trend of state practice, both principles formulate the general principle of international law. In sum, they add a small group of rules which feature the new world order in the aftermath of World War II.

Theorizing the Art of Law

Professor O’Connell in the introduction confesses that the book is inspired by the writings of Hersch Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht wrote on the growing influence of Realism, which emphasizes the moral duty of national leaders to amass military assets, project power, and suppress opponents. Realism teaches disregard for the law that constrains resort to force. The seven decades between the publication of The Grotian Tradition and The Art of Law is a catalog of legal arguments reflecting Realist influence. The book underscores Phillip Allott’s observation that ‘the sordid justifications of war persist and, in the 21st Century, are being strengthened by the emerging of new forms of old atavisms.’ (p. 16)

Believing in military force helps account for the violence, privation, and environmental decline of this century. This, in sum, could be accounted for and classified as precursors of the pandemic. Exacerbated by the extraordinary investment of capital and human ingenuity that has been poured into the invention and stockpiling of weapons. Driven by the insecurities of nations who had trillions for their militaries, but only a trickle for solving climate change or public health care policy. To put things into perspective, consider NATO’s annual budget which is bigger than the WHO’s. Lauterpacht foresaw this. As a response to his foresight, he reminded readers of the natural law principles available to preserve the law in the face of Realist ideology, principles envisioning peace as law’s purpose, and the preference for legal dispute resolution. The Art of Law returns these pointers and is underpinned by what Allott refers to as the ‘ancient idea of the essential unity of humanity.’ (p. 5)

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Re-igniting Theory and Practice

The book accounts for an assessment of international law in the absence of natural law. It is left with positive law alone, which is made through positive action expressing consent. To understand this conundrum, it must be ascertained why consent has a legal effect. Since consent can be withdrawn and is not a sufficient basis for the most important legal principles.

While critics argue for greater ability to resort to military force further the argument to enable the state practice and opinion Juris- the building blocks of customary international law. They are, however, dissolving the rules restricting resort to force. This positivist perspective turns out to be consistent with realist political theory holding that the only actual fetter on state action is not law, but coercive power, especially in the form of an opponent’s superior military strength.

It must be noted that consent and norms of jus cogens permit and control state practice. Regarding the theology of law, it should be noted that they relied on a method of discerning extra-positive norms. However, since we find ourselves in a pluralistic world that has international law as a common forum of utilization and discussion. Further, the book, re-considers law on the use of force using the principles of jus cogens which prohibit the use of force. As a common tone to the book, each chapter begins with a case study involving the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, given their privileged position to ‘enforce the peace.’

Salient features

The chapters highlight the gross violations of international law by the Permanent five on whom (most importantly) rests the responsibility to protect. By showcasing the blatant abuse, the author showcases the reinforcement of the Realist belief in military force which has failed to create the national security it promised. And additionally, has become a black hole soaking human and capital resources. This being the moot point the author wishes to convey- that security can only be found through the law, the law prohibiting force and providing alternatives for resolving disputes.

In Chapter 6, the author turns to the performance arts to re-generate passion and commitment for a peaceful settlement. Courts are a dramatic alternative to violence. International Courts and Tribunals themselves, have been touted as a formalistic piece of theatre. They can offer to play their role and can be enhanced through insights from theatre and other empirical studies. Even teaching and scholarship can move preferences from war stories to legal drama.

The classical narrative spun around the prohibition of the use of force is enshrined in the UN Charter. This process of crystallizing a sacrosanct value demands a historical study of the interwar era. Avoiding a historical discourse, the preparatory works of the San Francisco conference highlight the delegates’ firm belief and advocacy towards a new legal regime. The same conviction was expressed by the ICJ a few years later, in Corfu (Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4). In
the last part of the judgment, it qualified "the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rising to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in an international organization, find a place in international law". The distinction between the pre-Charter and the post-Charter law could not be clearer.

Moreover, the rule prohibiting the use of force proved to be endowed with an exceptional capacity to resist the inconsistent practice. In Nicaragua the ICJ held that conducts inconsistent with this rule if accompanied with an appeal to the exception of justification, produces the paradoxical effect of enhancing rather than weaken its normativity (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States of America). Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para 185). Thus, in short, what seems obvious in the face of multiple violations is the conviction of the international community that the existence of a prohibition, despite its relative ineffectiveness, is preferable to the return to the Hobbesian state of nature which featured the pre-Charter era.

**Codifying International Law**

Before the Vienna Conventions, it remained an arduous attempt to quote the existence of a higher law. Faintly acknowledged in the Corfu Channel Case certain rules constituted the “essential foundations” of the new legal order. A few months after the conclusion of the Vienna conference, in Barcelona Traction (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3), the ICJ referred to certain rights whose “importance” entailed that “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection”. The normative value of a right became thus the decisive element for the development of the doctrine of the obligations erga omnes.

One can hardly deduce from these sparse fragments the highly sophisticated legal regime enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention. In the same vein, it is difficult, after fifty years from its drafting, to provide examples of treaties declared void and null because of their inconsistency with a jus cogens rule. Yet, as showed by Mary-Ellen O’Connell’s book, the existence and the legal regime of jus cogens is conspicuously considered as part of international law to the point that its scope and function considerably expanded well outside the limited field of the law of treaties.

It can be easily ascertained that there remains to be a noted emergence of rules protecting the collective interests of the world community. This ‘trend’ seems to be the product of countless social factors, among which, perhaps, the sense of justice, reasonableness, fairness, and necessity of a rule which matches the needs of the international community in a given historical time. In other words, the drafters of the Charter were aware that they were not codifying a previous practice but rather were writing a law for the emerging world order. In the same vein, the ILC members who put on the table the idea of jus cogens, the judges of the ICJ who formulated the idea of obligations erga omnes highlighting, perhaps erroneously, the importance of the rights involved; the delegates to the Vienna conference who voted in favor of Articles 53 and
VCLT, all were inspired by the same sentiment, namely that they were materializing the principles of the new international ethos for the new world.

Conclusion

In the end, the book offers a journey and quest for justice and fairness. It attempts to transform the discourse around international law, upon the condition, however, to be vested in positive terms. It can be suspected that while writing of natural law and on its contribution to contemporary international law. And the book which came out of it represents a precious reference for whoever should attempt to navigate, even against the tide, these troubled waters.
Research Centres of JSIA

CENTRE FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY (CGGP)

Traditional notions of sovereignty and the nation-state in international relations and international law have, if not entirely eroded, been joined by the rise in importance of transnational actors. These bodies may be state driven international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the G-20, regional political organizations such as the Southern African Development Community, or private sector entities ranging from multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to activist networks. Cooperation and interdependence between this network of state and non-state actors with the intention of tackling problems that transcend traditional nation-state boundaries is the aim of the area of study known as global governance. The Centre for Global Governance and Policy (CGGP) is unique in its study of global governance issues. CGGP is held jointly by the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) and Jindal Global Law School (JGLS). As such, CGGP combines legal and International Relations perspectives. As disciplines, International Relations and Law often speak in separate tones. CGGP aims at intensive and multi-disciplinary research on the abovementioned cross-border problems, marrying the insights of Law and International Relations to address both the academe and a policymaking audience. CGGP emphasizes a Global South perspective and probes the possibility for more balanced and even-handed structure for global governance. Simultaneously, CGGP feels that academic focus on Indian foreign policy is fixated on strategic issues relating to immediate neighbours (i.e. Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka et al) or with Europe and the US, leaving the country's relations with Latin America, Africa, and the rest of Asia understudied. The CGGP seeks to break new ground in transcending this parochial mould and promoting cutting edge research on South-South relations with a special onus on India’s role as a bridge-builder and consensus maker. In March 2011, CGGP released a report entitled Rethinking International Institutions: A Global South Agenda. The Report interrogates existing international institutions—both formal institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations Security Council, and informal institutions, including concepts like humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion. The Report builds on existing literature on institutions within International Relations and International Law parlance. It notes the declining prominence conferred by the Global South on traditional international institutions, and examines the implications for the rise of so-called post millennium international institutions. The Report highlights diverging aspirations between, roughly, advanced and less advanced emerging economies, creating marked differences in use of traditional international institutions, and access to post millennium international institutions. The Report calls for the development of a Standing Committee in the G-77, chaired by India, to address these divergences.

CENTRE FOR STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (CSPV)
The Centre aims to study political violence from two prisms—globalized violence and globalized ethics—and to explore alternative ways to understand it. The Centre takes an interdisciplinary approach, in particular combining international relations, political theory, sociology, ethics and philosophy in general. There is a particular focus on specific and urgent phenomena, such as mass killing, forced displacement, human security, and gender-based violence. Starting from Western ways of thinking, the Centre’s focus has expanded to cover non-Western philosophy, thereby inserting inter-civilizational perspectives. The Centre also aims to provide an Indian hub for those interested in both globalized violence and ethics.

Tackling political violence is a daunting task. Part of its reason exists in its very paradoxical nature that all politics requires some kinds of violence in some stages in order to establish and secure authority. Poststructuralist understanding tells us about the inevitable linkage between politics and violence. Nevertheless, it is a hasty evaluation that we have lived in a world of harming and the harmed. Learning and analysing globalized violence is, therefore, a task to learn globalized ethics, and vice versa. CSPV organizes bi-weekly reading seminars with faculty and postgraduate students. It will host international seminars and lectures and provide the JGU community with opportunities to exchange views and enriching ideas. Research outcomes will be released through various media, including the University’s in-house journals and working papers, so that the Centre will also offer a locus for global feedback. Finally, the Centre also aims to develop international linkages and joint activities with JSIA’s other research centres. The overall goal of the Centre will be to provide firm knowledge and value basis for the future generations of scholars and practitioners, both domestic and global.

CENTRE FOR NEW ECONOMIC STUDIES (CNES)

Espousing the philosophy of how contemporary economic theories look at socio-economic problems in a variety of ways, the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES) through its research and activities aims to focus more on exploring the diversity of the scholarship on economics. At CNES, students and young researchers are not only exposed to the basic foundations of economic reasoning and thought but are exposed to the inter-disciplinary application of the discipline of economics in fields of political science (via political economy), psychology (via behavioural economics), history (via economic history), legal studies (via law and economics) etc.

In most universities and traditional learning centres for mainstream economics learning, there still remains a lacuna between the taught economic theory and the application of such theories in the real policy environment. CNES aims to fill this lacuna by linking economic theory with historical experience(s) and empirical observation under a robust, experimental environment of research. At CNES, teaching or understanding a given economic theory cannot be viewed merely as an exposition of received and established truths or as an intellectual exercise in the skills of logical deduction and inference.
CENTRE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES (CMES)

The objectives of the Centre are: fostering interdisciplinary research on Middle East Studies in collaboration with regional academics, experts and practitioners; conducting research and analysis on bilateral relations between India and the Middle East to explore synergies and address mutual long-standing economic, political and social challenges; supporting Arabic, Farsi and Turkish language studies to widen access to first-hand knowledge of the Middle East; developing materials and resources for educators and briefing the wider public; contributing to broad dissemination of research results and information regarding the Middle East; and expanding the network of institutional partnerships with universities in the Middle East, opening opportunities for student and faculty exchange.

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES)

The field of European studies has over the decades engaged in extensive research of the plurality and diversity of Europe. Consequently, any focus on Europe has been of an elaborated yet contested one. Moving beyond the “tunnel history” which risks ignoring the relations of domination, exploitation and exclusion of non-Europe that has shaped Europe to the present day, CES aims to contextually study socio-political and legal transformations that continues to reinvent the region and engage in interdisciplinary diffusions - a shift from eternally studying Europe as the “inside” to Europe “inside-out”. The Centre for European Studies (CES) intends to build an unprecedented and discursive community of researchers who can engage and debate their approaches in open floors together with peers from other continents, academic traditions and cultures. Founded in 2011, CES at the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) aims to establish plural observers who will endeavour to study Europe, Europeanness and its myriad identities as a reflexive concern through three core research groups: Anthropology of Europe • European Politics, Culture and Society • New Democracies of Europe Centre for European Studies is now a part of Globus Research Cluster funded by EU commission’s Horizon 2020 project. The cluster is led by Prof. Helene Sjursen, ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway. Earlier, CES has coordinated and published the European edition of the Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA) Volume 2 Issue 1. It was released by Cord Meier-Klodt, Acting Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi. Through its research networking, CES has coordinated and concluded JSIA MoUs with Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland; Centre for European Studies, Katholieke Universiteit (KU), Leuven, Belgium, Institute for European Global Studies, Basel University, Switzerland and Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

CENTRE FOR A NEW SOUTH ASIA (CNSA)

The Centre seeks to mitigate the security dilemma of the South Asia region of great potential and immense risk by reviving the liberal and free exchange which formerly existed and which is the foundation of peace and civilizational growth. The Centre utilizes interdisciplinary research, debate, dialogue, performances and ideas to advance this goal. Along with talks, seminars, conferences and exchanges with academics, students and practitioners from across the region as well as globally, the Centre focuses on the power of performances and consanguinity in culture to move the prevailing
paradigm from a realist zero sum interaction towards the liberal order prevalent in other parts of the world.

CENTRE FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES (CAS)

Located at the crossroads of South Asia and Central Asia, facing southwards from the Hindukush into the Indian sub-continent and looks down northwards into India’s extended neighbourhood. Afghanistan’s political geography has left a deep imprint not only on the regional geopolitical calculus but is also mirrored in its diverse and complex sociocultural tapestry. Traditionally the India has had deep civilizational links with Afghanistan. The change in political geography of the region with the 1947 partition notwithstanding, India has maintained good political relations with the Afghan state. The only aberration thus far being the period of Taliban rule (1996-2001). India’s engagement with the country was stepped up after 2001 with the aim of contributing to international efforts to bring peace, stability and eventually resuscitating the country as a bridge between South and Central Asia. However, intensified political and diplomatic engagement has not translated into a deeper socio-anthropological understanding of Afghan society, essential to evolving a sound policy prognosis.

The Centre for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) through its research intends to provide a window into complex yet fascinating dynamics shaping sociocultural, geo-political and economic landscape of Afghanistan. CAS would contribute to cutting edge, policy-oriented research on Afghanistan and its implications for the region at large. It would also provide a platform for collaborative exchange programs and transmission of knowledge to students and scholars.

CENTRE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES (CSEAS)

Southeast Asia, a sub-region of Asia, consists of the countries that are geographically south of China, east of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia, which includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries share historical, political, economic, cultural and social ties, and all but East Timor are members of the regional bloc called Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent years, the regional bloc has taken several initiatives to integrate member countries, including developing a single market that will ensure the free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and the free flow of capital. Nonetheless, the region is far from being homogeneous and encompassing with different political institutions, diverse languages and cultures. Because of the geostrategic location and its emerging economy, the region has become greater interest to its neighbouring countries as well as the Western democracies.

JINDAL CENTRE FOR ISRAEL STUDIES (JCIS)

The field of Israel Studies is an important area of geo-politics. It merges studies of race, peoplehood, culture, identity, history, regional conflict in the Middle-East and spatial coexistence. Since August 2012 Jindal Centre for Israel studies in JSIA through the initiatives of Dr. Rohee Dasgupta has been engaging MA students in the study of modern Israel and organizing academic conferences. It has fostered institutional
networks and exchange on Israel Studies with the Schusterman Centre for Israel Studies, Brandeis University, USA and Tel Aviv University, Israel. JCIS aims to carry out research on race, ethnicity and conflict; Jewish Identity, bilateral relations between India and Israel, the American-Jewish Diaspora and Israel as well as on Europe and Israel. It intends to build a research colloquium of scholars pertaining to modern Israeli politics, culture, society, and economy and the betterment of Israeli-Palestinian relations. It welcomes students to write MA dissertations on Israel Studies. JCIS currently offers two elective courses in the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) and the Jindal Global Law School (JGLS).

CENTRE FOR AFRICAN, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES (CALACS)

JSIA’s Centre for African, Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CALACS) mission is to enhance interregional understanding and cooperation through policy-oriented research, dialogue and training. To achieve this goal, CALACS serves as a hub at JGU for academics, policy-makers, diplomats and businessmen in India and abroad to connect, exchange, and develop initiatives related to: African, Latin American and Caribbean (ALAC) countries relations with India ALAC countries, India and the Global South: interregional policy coalitions and institutions Sustainable development, trade, investment and other issues affecting ALAC countries.

CENTRE FOR BORDER STUDIES (CBS)

It is increasingly being recognized in the study of international relations that Borderlands represent a dynamic subsystem marked by complex and historical interlinkages between communities and local governance systems that transcend established inter-state boundaries. The concept of interstate borders (and the functional role of frontier regions) in international relations has undergone a fundamental shift. Borders are not only seen as barriers, but also as institutional mechanisms that create new opportunity structures for the communities residing adjacent to them. Despite the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of Borderland Studies (and the creation of academic associations both regionally and globally) there is still a marked disjuncture in terms of practical and academic training being provided to students of the social sciences (such as international relations, political science, history and sociology) in the Indian context for understanding developmental trajectories of Borderlands.

The Centre for Border Studies seeks to conduct research in border regions through collaborations and participation of institutions based in border districts and border communities. Some of the Key Research being undertaken include: BADP Case Studies, Rehabilitation Challenges in J&K (LoC) and confidence building measures, health inequality in Border Regions and Border Trade, markets and Infrastructure. The four pillars of the Centre are: Research Initiatives, Certificate Programme in Border Studies, Border Studies Immersion Programmes (Field Schools and Internships) and Advocacy.
JINDAL CENTRE FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH (JCGS)

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly poverty eradication, requires national policies, an international and regional cooperation that supports development efforts. The research Centres that are focusing on the Global South studies are very few in the Southern globe in comparison to their number in the North countries. Jindal Centre for the Global South aims to fill this gap and conducts policy-oriented research, dialogue and training into the social, economic and political key issues across countries of the Global South with a special emphasis on South-South Cooperation and its underpinning development opportunities for the Global South countries. The Centre promotes the unity of the South in achieving the SDGs while recognizing the diversity of national interests and priorities. Jindal Centre for the Global South is affiliated to the School of International Affairs at Jindal Global University (JGU). It draws researchers from across the faculties of social sciences and humanities from inside and outside JGU.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (CSS)

The role of security is paramount to all levels of the global environment, from international organisations and states to societies and individuals. Therefore, while the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) shall concentrate more specifically on topics of security, it shall situate itself in the larger domain of international relations studies. International security is in the end not merely defined by the concept of war or the effects to mitigate it, but rather goes far beyond it to encompass a plethora of issues. Every action of every actor in the international system defines the concept of security both for itself and for others in the system. In this, the concept of international security has been expanded to reflect, not merely the study of state security but also include topics like ethnic, sectarian and religious conflict; civil wars and state failure; cyber and space warfare; resource related security issues; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; defence economics and also the role of ethics or morality in security policies.

The evolution of the field of international security studies is an impressive topic in itself. It has changed and diversified from an initial concern with superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons to focus upon sectors of political, economic, military, environmental and social life. CSS believes that these sectors must be better understood in order to gauge and examine their influence on important current trends defining international politics and dynamics as well. In this regard, the Coronavirus pandemic, a surge of populism in Europe, the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia and increasing resource scarcity in many regions of the world must all be understood as key security issues in order to gain a deeper understanding of international security as a whole. The Centre for Security Studies shall therefore, through in-depth analysis, reports and policy briefs explore both regional and thematic topics in the broader field of International Security Studies.

There is also another aspect in which CSS shall attempt to introduce a unique approach. Much like the study of International Relations, the study of security is also a western
dominated discipline and has in the past failed to understand aspects of security as viewed through other perspectives. The Centre thus also hopes to introduce newer, non-western perspectives to problems of security, so as to formulate more comprehensive policies and opinions in understanding global dynamics.
Submission Guidelines for Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA)

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Manuscripts and all editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Editor-in-Chief, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, at Jindal School of International Affairs O.P. Jindal Global University Sonipat-Narela Road, Sonipat, Haryana-131001, NCR of Delhi, India.

Manuscripts should be submitted via email to editorjjia@gmail.com or submissionsjjia@gmail.com. Contributors must provide their affiliation; complete postal and e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.

The onus lies on the author to divulge any potential conflict of interest regarding the manuscript.

The preferred length of an article submitted to JJIA is between 6000 and 7500 words including references. All articles must be accompanied by an abstract of 150–200 words together with eight important keywords.

Book reviews should be between 1500 -2500 words with full details of the reviewed book including the subtitle, the name of the author, place of publication, name of publisher, year of publication, number of pages and the price. Notes should be numbered serially and presented as footnotes. Notes, other than website sources (with access date), must contain more than a mere reference.

All figures, i.e., diagrams, images, photographs and tables should be placed at the end of the contribution and numbered in the order they appear in text. Table and figure locations should be indicated in text by callouts (e.g., “[See Table 1]”) inserted after the respective paragraphs.

Each table or figure should have a heading, an explanatory caption, if necessary, and a source or reference. Tables need to be submitted in MS Excel or MS Word.

All figures having an image resolution of minimum 300 dpi, 1500 pixels, min width 4 inches and their format should be TIFF or JPEG. It is requested that excessive formatting for tables and figures be avoided.

Limit the levels of heading within an article to two, or at most three. Avoid long headings and do not number them.

JJIA prefers British spellings throughout (‘labour’ not ‘labor’, ‘centre’ not ‘center’); universal ‘s’ in ‘-ise’ and ‘-isation’ words.

Single quotes throughout; double quotes used within single quotes. Spellings of words in quotations should not be changed.
Quotations of 45 words or more should be separated from the text and indented with one space with a line space above and below supported by specific page source.

Use 'eighteenth century', ‘1980s’. It is suggested to spell out numbers from one to nine (in words), 10 and above to remain in figures. However, for exact measurements use only figures (5 km, 7 per cent not %).

Use thousands, millions and billions. It is advised that the use of italics should be minimized unless necessary, but used consistently.

Permissions and Releases- Material taken directly from a copyrighted source should be clearly identified, and the copyright holder’s written permission to reproduce it must be submitted in a separate file. It is the author’s responsibility to seek permission for reproducing copyrighted material.

References and Citations for citing and referring to scholarly works the Journal follows Chicago Manual of Style. The Journal prefers footnotes instead of endnotes. We will consider manuscripts for publication only if they are written in accordance with this style.

Sample of Chicago Manual of Style is given below.

For further details, kindly see the website - http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html

Book

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)


In-text citations

(Grazer and Fishman 2015, 12)

(Smith 2016, 315–160)

Chapter or other part of an edited book

In the reference list, include the page range for the chapter or part. In the text, cite specific pages.

Reference list entry

In-text citation

(Thoreau 2016, 177–78)

In some cases, you may want to cite the collection as a whole instead.

Reference list entry


In-text citation

(D’Agata 2016, 177–78)

Translated book

Reference list entry


In-text citation

(Lahiri 2016, 146)

E-book

For books consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. For other types of e-books, name the format. If no fixed page numbers are available, cite a section title or a chapter or other number in the text, if any (or simply omit).

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)


In-text citations

(Austen 2007, chap. 3)

(Borel 2016, 92)

(Kurland and Lerner 1987, chap. 10, doc. 19)
Journal article

In the reference list, include the page range for the whole article. In the text, cite specific page numbers. For articles consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. Many journal articles list a DOI (Digital Object Identifier). A DOI forms a permanent URL that begins https://doi.org/. This URL is preferable to the URL that appears in your browser’s address bar.

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)


In-text citations

(Keng, Lin, and Orazem 2017, 9–10)

(LaSalle 2017, 95)

(Satterfield 2016, 170)

Journal articles often list many authors, especially in the sciences. If there are four or more authors, list up to ten in the reference list; in the text, list only the first, followed by et al. (“and others”). For more than ten authors (not shown here), list the first seven in the reference list, followed by et al.

Reference list entry


In-text citation

(Bay et al. 2017, 465)

For more examples, see 15.46–49 in The Chicago Manual of Style.

News or magazine article
Articles from newspapers or news sites, magazines, blogs, and the like are cited similarly. In the reference list, it can be helpful to repeat the year with sources that are cited also by month and day. Page numbers, if any, can be cited in the text but are omitted from a reference list entry. If you consulted the article online, include a URL or the name of the database.

**Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)**


**In-text citation**

(Manjoo 2017)

(Mead 2017, 43)

(Pegoraro 2007)

Readers’ comments are cited in the text but omitted from a reference list.

**In-text citation**

(Eduardo B [Los Angeles], March 9, 2017, comment on Manjoo 2017)

For more examples, see 15.49 (newspapers and magazines) and 15.51 (blogs) in *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

**Book review**

**Reference list entry**


**In-text citation**

(Kakutani 2016)

**Interview**

**Reference list entry**

**In-text citation**

(Stamper 2017)

**Thesis or dissertation**

**Reference list entry**


**In-text citation**

(Rutz 2013, 99–100)

**Website content**

It is often sufficient simply to describe web pages and other website content in the text (“As of May 1, 2017, Yale’s home page listed . . .”). If a more formal citation is needed, it may be styled like the examples below. For a source that does not list a date of publication or revision, use *n.d.* (for “no date”) in place of the year and include an access date.

**Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)**


**In-text citations**

(Bouman 2016)

(Google 2017)

(Yale University n.d.)

For more examples, see 15.50–52 in *The Chicago Manual of Style*. For multimedia, including live performances, see 15.57.

**Social media content**
Citations of content shared through social media can usually be limited to the text (as in the first example below). If a more formal citation is needed, a reference list entry may be appropriate. In place of a title, quote up to the first 160 characters of the post. Comments are cited in reference to the original post.

**Text**

Conan O’Brien’s tweet was characteristically deadpan: “In honor of Earth Day, I’m recycling my tweets” (@ConanOBrien, April 22, 2015).

**Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)**


**In-text citations**

(Chicago Manual of Style 2015)

(Souza 2016)

(Michele Truty, April 17, 2015, 1:09 p.m., comment on Chicago Manual of Style 2015)

**Personal communication**

Personal communications, including email and text messages and direct messages sent through social media, are usually cited in the text only; they are rarely included in a reference list.

**In-text citation**

(Sam Gomez, Facebook message to author, August 1, 2017)